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The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of               
Freedom of Association 
JOHN D. INAZU 
This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s categories of expressive and 
intimate association first announced in the 1984 decision, Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, are neither well-settled nor defensible.  These indefensible categories 
matter deeply to groups that have sought to maintain an unpopular composition 
and message in the face of anti-discrimination laws.  These groups have been 
denied associational protections.  They have been forced to change their 
composition—and therefore their message.  They no longer exist in the form they 
once held and desired to maintain. 
The Roberts categories of intimate and expressive association are at least 
partly to blame.  These categories set in place a framework in which courts 
sidestep the hard work of weighing the constitutional values that shape the laws 
that bind us.  This Article exposes the problems inherent in these categories and 
calls for a meaningful constitutional inquiry into laws impinging upon group 
autonomy.  It suggests that the Court eliminate the categories of intimate and 
expressive association and turn instead to the right of assembly.  Our right to 
assemble—to form relationships, to gather, to exist as groups of our choosing—is 
fundamental to liberty and genuine pluralism.   
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The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of               
Freedom of Association 
JOHN D. INAZU* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The women’s soccer team at the University of North Carolina has won 
twenty national championships, an achievement unmatched anywhere else 
in amateur athletics.  The LPGA hosts a women’s professional golf tour 
with nationally televised tournaments and roughly fifty million dollars in 
annual prize money.  Music has thrived (or perhaps suffered, depending on 
one’s perspective) with all-male groups like the Beatles, the Righteous 
Brothers, and the Jonas Brothers, and all-female groups like the Pointer 
Sisters, the Indigo Girls, and the Dixie Chicks.  All-black choirs perform 
gospel music, and the Mormon Tabernacle Choir consists of, well, 
Mormons.  The Talmudical Institute of Upstate New York, the Holy 
Trinity Orthodox Seminary (Russian Orthodox), and Morehouse College 
admit only men to their programs; Barnard College, Bryn Mawr College, 
and Wellesley College admit only women.  During the women’s 
movement in the early twentieth century, women organized around banner 
meetings, balls, swimming races, potato-sack races, baby shows, meals, 
pageants, and teatimes.1  Gay organizations “‘have relied on exclusively 
                                                                                                                          
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Duke University School of Law.  Thanks to Rick Garnett, Bill 
Marshall, Rob Vischer, Bob Cochran, Guy-Uriel Charles, Jeff Powell, Neil Siegel, Jonathan Mitchell, 
Jeff Spinner-Halev, Mike Lienesch, Susan Bickford, Stanley Hauerwas, Amin Aminfar, Max Eichner, 
Sara Beale, James Boyle, David Lange, Allen Buchanan, Joseph Blocher, Curt Bradley, Sam Buell, 
Nathan Chapman, Steve Smith, Lawrence Solum, Andy Koppelman, Eugene Volokh, Jed Purdy, Stuart 
Benjamin, and participants at the faculty workshop at Duke Law School for helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this article.  Thanks also to Jenna Snow and her colleagues at the Connecticut Law 
Review.  Some of the arguments in this Article are summarized in the Amicus Brief of Pacific Justice 
Institute and Christian Service Charities in Support of Petitioner Christian Legal Society in Christian 
Legal Society v. Kane, 319 F. App’x 645 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1371), cert. granted, Christian Legal 
Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 795 (2009), aff’d and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).  The author 
participated in the preparation of that brief (with Peter Lepiscopo).  
1 LINDA LUMSDEN, RAMPANT WOMEN: SUFFRAGISTS AND THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY 3 (1997).  
Lumsden has suggested that “virtually the entire suffrage story can be told through the prism of the 
right of assembly.”  Id. at 144.  Iris Marion Young has argued that: 
[Female separatism] promoted the empowerment of women through self-
organization, the creation of separate and safe spaces where women could share and 
analyze their experiences, voice their anger, play with and create bonds with one 
another, and develop new and better institutions and practices.   
Most elements of the contemporary women’s movement have been separatist to 
some degree.  Separatists seeking to live as much of their lives as possible in 
women-only institutions were largely responsible for the creation of the women’s 
culture that burst forth all over the United States by the mid 1970s, and continues to 
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gay environments in which to feel safe, to build relationships, and to 
develop political strategy,’” including “many exclusively gay social and 
activity clubs, retreats, vacations, and professional organizations.”2  
Sometimes discrimination is a good thing. 
Of course, discrimination also has its costs.  Those excluded—the Salt 
Lake City atheist with perfect pitch, the male golfer with limited swing 
velocity but machine-like precision—are denied opportunities, privileges, 
and relationships they might have otherwise had.  They may be harmed 
economically, socially, and psychologically.3  When groups exclude based 
upon characteristics like race, gender, or sexual orientation, the 
psychological harm of exclusion may also extend well beyond those who 
have actually sought acceptance to others who share their characteristics.  
For all of these reasons, there is much to be said for an anti-discrimination 
norm and the value of equality that underlies it.   
But our constitutionalism also includes values other than equality, 
                                                                                                                          
claim the loyalty of millions of women—in the form of music, poetry, spirituality, 
literature, celebrations, festivals, and dances.  Whether drawing on images of 
Amazonian grandeur, recovering and revaluing traditional women’s arts, like 
quilting and weaving, or inventing new rituals based on medieval witchcraft, the 
development of such expressions of women’s culture gave many feminists images of 
a female-centered beauty and strength entirely outside capitalist patriarchal 
definitions of feminine pulchritude.  The separatist impulse also fostered the 
development of the many autonomous women’s institutions and services that have 
concretely improved the lives of many women, whether feminists or not—such as 
health clinics, battered women’s shelters, rape crisis centers, and women’s 
coffeehouses and bookstores. 
IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 161–62 (1990) (internal citation 
omitted).   
2 Brief of Gays & Lesbians for Individual Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11, 
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371) [hereinafter Brief in Support 
of Petitioner] (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  For a history of the early gay 
rights movement and its reliance on freedom of association, see Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association 
and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1525–33 
(2001).  Carpenter notes that “[t]he rise of gay equality and public visibility coincided—not 
coincidentally, however—with the rise of vigorous protection for First Amendment freedom, especially 
the freedom of association.”  Id. at 1532–33; see also Gay Students Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 
509 F.2d 652, 659–60 (1st Cir. 1974) (“Considering the important role that social events can play in 
individuals’ efforts to associate to further their common beliefs, the prohibition of all social events 
must be taken to be a substantial abridgement of associational rights, even if assumed to be an indirect 
one.”); Brief for Petitioner at 30, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371) [hereinafter Brief for 
Petitioner] (“In an earlier era, public universities frequently attempted to bar gay rights groups from 
recognized student organization status on account of their supposed encouragement of what was then 
illegal behavior.  The courts made short shrift of those policies.” (citing Gay & Lesbian Student Ass’n 
v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 366 (8th Cir. 1988))).  
3 Matt Zwolinski, Why Not Regulate Private Discrimination?, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043, 1052 
(2006) (“The feeling of social isolation that results from private discrimination can be psychologically 
devastating.  This is especially true for children, who are particularly prone to question their own self-
worth in reaction to discrimination from their peers, but the effects hold for adults as well.  Private 
discrimination can have a tremendous impact on the psychological well-being of even the most self-
assured adults.”). 
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including the value of group autonomy.4  When these values clash—as 
they inevitably do whenever anti-discrimination law challenges a group’s 
right to exclude—we ought to encourage a weighing of these constitutional 
values rather than a wholesale adoption of one over the other.5  This is no 
easy task.  Even the polarized ways in which we describe the clash of 
values points to the inherent conflict and the stakes at issue: what Andrew 
Koppelman and Tobias Wolff characterize as a “right to discriminate”6 
might also be called “a right to exist.”7 
The Supreme Court has chosen to address these challenges through the 
categories of “intimate” and “expressive” association.  Koppelman and 
Wolff have recently intimated that these categories, first announced in the 
1984 decision, Roberts v. United States Jaycees,8 reflect a “well-settled law 
of freedom of association.”9  Whether the sixteen years between Roberts 
and the Court’s 2000 decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale10 
established an “ancien regime”11 is open to question.  But the problem with 
intimate and expressive association is not simply that they are less 
entrenched than Koppelman and Wolff assert—it is that they are 
indefensible.  Intimate association offers no constitutional protections 
beyond those afforded by the right of privacy.  Expressive association fails 
                                                                                                                          
4 I have chosen to call attention to the value of group autonomy rather than liberty because group 
autonomy bears an intrinsic relationship to associational freedom while liberty risks being construed in 
individualistic ways.   
5 The perennial tension between group autonomy and equality is one reason that John Rawls fails 
to provide a persuasive account of freedom of association in attempting to distinguish between the 
“basic structure” and the “background society.”  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 6, 79, 386 
(1971).  For one critique among many of Rawls along these lines, see NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, 
MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA 53–55 (1998) 
[hereinafter ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS].  Rosenblum concludes that “the morality of 
association provides a pluralist background culture, much of it incongruent with liberal democracy.”  
Id. at 55.  
6 ANDREW KOPPELMAN & TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE?: HOW THE 
CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF FREE ASSOCIATION xi (2009).  
7 Cf. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[F]orcing [the 
Christian Legal Society] to accept as members those who engage in or approve of homosexual conduct 
would cause the group as it currently identifies itself to cease to exist.”); RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, 
THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 142 (1984) (“When an 
institution that is voluntary in membership cannot define the conditions of belonging, that institution in 
fact ceases to exist.”). 
8 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
9 KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at x–xi.  I take Koppelman and Wolff’s claim to be that 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), “capriciously and destructively” disrupted the 
framework first set in place by Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).  Id. at x–xi.  (“Until 2000, 
. . . [a]ssociations that conveyed messages were entitled to be free of restrictions, including restrictions 
on their membership practices, that interfered with the dissemination of those messages.  Intimate 
associations of small groups of people had a stronger right, to refuse association with anyone for any 
reason.”).  Koppelman and Wolff may have a broader history in mind.  For example, they acknowledge 
the “germinal case” of the right of association in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 
(1958).  Id. at 18–22.  But it seems clear that Roberts does most of the work that they want to embrace 
as the “well-settled law of freedom of association.”  Id. at xi. 
10 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
11 KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at xi.   
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to account for the expressive potential inherent in all groups.  
Intimate association and expressive association are indefensible 
categories, but they matter deeply.  They matter to the Jaycees.  They 
matter to the Chi Iota Colony of the Alpha Epsilon Pi fraternity, a now 
defunct Jewish social group at the College of Staten Island that had sought 
to limit its membership to men.12  They matter to the Christian Legal 
Society at Hastings Law School, a religious student group denied official 
recognition because of its desire to limit its membership to Christians who 
adhered to its moral code, which included a prohibition on homosexual 
conduct.13  Each of these groups sought to maintain an unpopular 
composition and message in the face of anti-discrimination laws.  Each 
was denied associational protection.  Each was forced to change its 
composition—and therefore its message.  Each no longer exists in the form 
it once held and desired to maintain. 
The demise of associational protections is at least partially attributable 
to the Roberts categories of intimate and expressive association.  These 
categories set in place a framework that allows courts to sidestep the hard 
work of weighing the constitutional values that shape the law that binds us.  
This Article exposes the problems inherent in these categories and calls for 
a meaningful constitutional inquiry into laws impinging upon group 
autonomy.  Absent such an inquiry, we are left with anti-discrimination 
norms unchecked by principles of group autonomy.  That conclusion was 
recently embraced by the Ninth Circuit in denying constitutional 
protections to a high school bible club that sought to limit its membership 
to Christians: 
States have the constitutional authority to enact legislation 
prohibiting invidious discrimination. . . . [W]e hold that the 
requirement that members [of a high school bible club] 
possess a “true desire to . . . grow in a relationship with Jesus 
Christ” inherently excludes non-Christians . . . , [thus 
violating] the District’s non-discrimination policies. . . .14 
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is troubling, but it in some ways represents 
the logical end of the current doctrine of association.   
This Article examines the reasoning that has led courts to conclude that 
a Christian group that excludes non-Christians is for that reason 
invidiously discriminating.  Part II revisits the initial recognition of 
                                                                                                                          
12 Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 149 (2d 
Cir. 2007).  
13 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2980–81 (2010). 
14 Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 644–45 (9th Cir. 2008).  The Ninth Circuit relied 
exclusively on Truth in rejecting the claims of the Christian Legal Society.  See Christian Legal Soc’y 
v. Kane, 319 F. App’x 645 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 
795 (2009), aff’d and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).   
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intimate and expressive association in Roberts.  Parts III and IV trace the 
roots of intimate and expressive association, respectively.  Part V details 
how the application of these categories in Roberts undermined the 
associational claims of the Jaycees.  Part VI uses the Chi Iota and Christian 
Legal Society cases to illustrate how the Roberts framework continues to 
damage associational freedom.  Finally, Part VII proposes that the Court 
remedy the problems in Roberts by eliminating the categories of intimate 
and expressive association.  It suggests that we recover a different 
constitutional right that offers better historical, theoretical, and doctrinal 
resources for strengthening group autonomy and the possibility of dissent: 
the right of assembly.15   
II.  CATEGORIZING THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 
The categories of intimate and expressive association first emerged in 
Justice Brennan’s 1984 Roberts opinion.16  Brennan announced that the 
Court had identified two distinct constitutional sources for the right of 
association.17  One line of decisions protected “intimate association” as “a 
fundamental element of personal liberty.”18  Another set of decisions 
guarded “expressive association,” which was “a right to associate for the 
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First 
Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and 
the exercise of religion.”19  Brennan contended that intimate and expressive 
association represented, respectively, the “intrinsic and instrumental 
features of constitutionally protected association.”20  These differences 
meant that “the nature and degree of constitutional protection afforded 
freedom of association may vary depending on the extent to which one or 
the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a 
given case.”21  
Brennan’s arguments implied two corollaries: (1) some associations 
were “nonintimate,” and (2) some associations were “nonexpressive.”  His 
reasoning thus suggested four possible categories of associations: (1) 
intimate expressive associations,22 (2) intimate nonexpressive associations, 
                                                                                                                          
15 See John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 566 (2010) 
[hereinafter Inazu, Forgotten Freedom] (describing the historical significance of the right of assembly).   
16 The Court first recognized a constitutional right of association in NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).  For an overview of the origins of association and its political, 
doctrinal, and theoretical underpinnings, see generally John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the 
Constitutional Right of Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485 (2010) [hereinafter Inazu, Strange Origins].  
17 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984).   
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 618. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
22 See id. (“The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally protected association may, 
of course, coincide.”). 
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(3) nonintimate expressive associations, and (4) nonintimate nonexpressive 
associations.  Since Roberts, it has become clear that there is no 
constitutionally significant distinction between the first two categories; 
intimate associations receive the highest level of constitutional protection 
regardless of whether they are also expressive.23 
The same is not true for the distinctions between the other categories.  
Brennan’s parsing of intrinsic and instrumental value and his reference to 
the varying “nature and degree of constitutional protection” for intimate 
and expressive associations signaled a clear privileging of the former over 
the latter.24  And the category of expressive association drew a line that left 
nonintimate nonexpressive associations—which would include most of the 
groups mentioned at the beginning of this Article—without any 
meaningful constitutional protections.25  
The Roberts framework thus created the following hierarchically 
ordered categories of associations:  
A.  Intimate Associations 
B.  Nonintimate Expressive Associations 
C.  Nonintimate Nonexpressive Associations 
It turns out that the groups in B sometimes lose, and the groups in C 
always lose.  
What is more, once a court places a group within either B or C, a 
                                                                                                                          
23 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2005); Flaskamp v. Dearborn 
Pub. Sch., 385 F.3d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 2004); City of Bremerton v. Widell, 51 P.3d 733, 741 (Wash. 
2002) (en banc). 
24 Brennan’s language did not expressly elevate intimate over expressive association, but it has 
been widely interpreted as having made this distinction.  See infra note 25 (collecting cases in which 
courts have applied less than strict scrutiny to laws impinging upon expressive association); cf. 
KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at x (explaining that, under Roberts, “[i]ntimate associations of 
small groups of people had a stronger right [than expressive associations], to refuse association with 
anyone for any reason”); AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 41 (1995) (contending 
that Brennan regarded expressive association “as instrumental and therefore subject to greater 
government intrusion”); David E. Bernstein, Expressive Association After Dale, 21 SOC. PHIL. & 
POL’Y. 195, 202 (2004) [hereinafter Bernstein, Expressive Association] (“The Court’s apparent disdain 
for expressive association claims had a marked effect on lower courts.”); George Kateb, The Value of 
Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35, 46 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) (“Running through 
Brennan’s opinion is the assumption that all nonintimate relationships are simply inferior to intimate 
ones.”); Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 532 n.209 (2001) (“In Roberts, 
Justice Brennan described a range of associations, each deserving of different levels of Constitutional 
protection.  While the right to ‘intimate’ association . . . is ‘intrinsic’ and worthy of the highest 
Constitutional protection, . . . the right of ‘expressive’ association [is] an instrumental right, and thus 
accorded less absolute protection.” (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–20)). 
25 See, e.g., City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23–28 (1989) (applying rational basis scrutiny 
to a city ordinance governing activity that qualified neither as a form of “intimate association” nor as a 
form of “expressive association” as those terms were described in Roberts); Conti v. City of Fremont, 
919 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A]n activity receives no special first amendment protection if it 
qualifies neither as a form of ‘intimate association’ nor as a form of ‘expressive association,’ as those 
terms were described in Roberts.”); Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251–52 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(concluding that the First Amendment does not protect nonintimate nonexpressive associations).  
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generic appeal to the state’s interest in eradicating discrimination usually 
trumps the group’s autonomy.26   In other words, the precise harms that 
may or may not be caused by the group do not really matter.  Following the 
Supreme Court’s lead in Roberts, most judicial opinions weighing anti-
discrimination objectives against group autonomy make little effort to link 
the specific remedy—forced inclusion in a particular group—to the 
specific harm—the effects of discrimination by that group in its particular 
social context.27  
Consider the Court’s analysis in Roberts itself.  Justice Brennan’s 
opinion appealed to “Minnesota’s compelling interest in eradicating 
discrimination against its female citizens . . . .”28  He reasoned that 
Minnesota furthered that compelling interest by assuring women equal 
access to the leadership skills, business contacts, and employment 
promotions offered by the Jaycees.29  But the national Jaycees already 
allowed women to join as Associate Individual Members, a status that 
presumably afforded them many of these business opportunities—the 
associate status precluded only voting, holding office, and eligibility for 
national awards, but women could “otherwise participate fully in Jaycee 
activities.”30  Moreover, the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the 
Jaycees had, in violation of the national organization’s policies, accepted 
women as full members for ten years.31   
Roberts’s oft-forgotten procedural posture matters here.  The litigation 
began when members of the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the 
Jaycees brought an administrative enforcement action of the Minnesota 
Human Rights Act32 against the national organization after it threatened to 
                                                                                                                          
26 Koppelman and Wolff note that while Roberts introduced a “balancing test” when “interference 
with membership . . . demonstrably interferes with expressive practice,” as a practical matter, “free 
association claims unrelated to viewpoint discrimination always lost in the Supreme Court under this 
standard.”  KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at 20. 
27 Cf. Bernstein, Expressive Association, supra note 24, at 202 (“Following Justice Brennan’s 
opinion in Roberts, lower federal courts and state supreme courts routinely held that the right of 
expressive association had to yield to antidiscrimination statutes.”); Richard A. Epstein, The 
Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 132 (2000) 
(“One striking feature of both Roberts and Dale is the ease with which these opinions hold that the 
antidiscrimination principle counts as a compelling state interest that limits the ability of voluntary 
associations to determine their own membership.”). 
28 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.   
29 Id. at 626. 
30 U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1563 (8th Cir. 1983); cf. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621 
(“[D]espite their inability to vote, hold office, or receive certain awards, women affiliated with the 
Jaycees attend various meetings, participate in selected projects, and engage in many of the 
organization’s social functions.”). 
31 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614. 
32 MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982) (specifying that it is an unfair discriminatory practice “[t]o 
deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 
and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, 
disability, national origin or sex”).  The federal courts deferred to the Minnesota Supreme Court for the 
threshold determination of whether the Jaycees fell under the scope of the Act as a “public 
accommodation.”  See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615–17.  
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revoke their charters.33  The national organization responded by suing state 
officials in federal district court to prevent enforcement of the Act.34  But 
the underlying dispute and the immediate effects of the holding of the case 
were always internal to the Jaycees.35 
For all of these reasons, it is unclear how forcing the national 
organization to recognize women as full members helped to eradicate 
gender discrimination in Minnesota by increasing access to the leadership 
skills, business contacts, and employment promotions offered by the 
Jaycees.  Even if the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters had denied full 
membership to women, it seems doubtful that making women eligible for 
leadership positions or national awards would have advanced Minnesota’s 
statutory interests significantly beyond the networking and social 
opportunities already afforded by their limited membership status.  Justice 
Brennan’s Roberts opinion contained no explanation of why this remedy 
helped to eradicate gender discrimination in these circumstances sufficient 
to trump the autonomy of this group.36  And his analysis did not only 
shortchange the Jaycees.  The framework of intimate and expressive 
association that crystallized in Roberts obscured the need to balance 
equality against group autonomy more generally, in part because Brennan 
never adequately articulated the theoretical underpinnings of his two 
categories of association.   
The next two sections will show why the Roberts categories are 
fundamentally misguided and how they hinder the important value of 
group autonomy.  They explore in more detail the roots of these categories 
and the theoretical challenges they create.  If a coherent theory exists to 
justify intimate and expressive association, it has yet to be identified.   
III.  INTIMATE ASSOCIATION 
The category of intimate association likely originated in a 1980 article 
by Kenneth Karst in the Yale Law Journal.37  Karst’s article, in turn, drew 
from Justice Douglas’s opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.38  This section 
                                                                                                                          
33 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614. 
34 Id. at 615. 
35 Moreover, it is plausible—perhaps even likely—that the vision favoring the full inclusion of 
women would have won out in the national organization absent interference by the courts.  As Judge 
Arnold pointed out in the lower court opinion, the question about whether to admit women as full 
members had been vigorously debated within the organization, and while resolutions favoring the 
admission of women had been defeated on three occasions prior to the Roberts litigation, each time a 
larger minority had voted in favor of the resolution.  McClure, 709 F.2d at 1561–62 & n.1.  
36 William Marshall observes that the Court offered a “one-sided” interpretation of the values 
conflict in Roberts: “While the associational rights of the Jaycees were considered to be virtually 
nonexistent, the state interests were found to be particularly weighty because of the social and business 
prominence of the Jaycees organization.”  William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of 
Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 68, 74 (1986). 
37 Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 626 (1980). 
38 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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traces these precursors to intimate association and the ways in which 
Brennan’s Roberts opinion adopted them.  
A.  Griswold and the Right of Association 
Griswold struck down a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of 
contraceptives and the giving of medical advice about their use, and 
specifically the application of this law to the use of contraceptives by 
married persons.39  Chief Justice Warren assigned the opinion to Douglas.  
In a draft that he shared only with Brennan, Douglas relied almost entirely 
on the First Amendment right of association,40 which the Court had first 
recognized seven years earlier in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.41  
Douglas argued that while marriage did “not fit precisely any of the 
categories of First Amendment rights,” it was “a form of association as 
vital in the life of a man or woman as any other, and perhaps more so.”42  
He reasoned that “[w]e would, indeed, have difficulty protecting the 
intimacies of one’s relations to [the] NAACP and not the intimacies of 
one’s marriage relation.”43  
After reviewing the draft, Brennan urged Douglas to abandon his 
exclusive reliance on the right of association.44  Brennan argued that 
marriage did not fall within the kind of association that the Court had 
recognized for purposes of political advocacy.45  He suggested that 
Douglas instead analogize the Court’s recognition of the right of 
association to a similar broadening of privacy into a constitutional right.  
Because neither privacy nor association could be found in the text of the 
Constitution, if association could be recognized as a freestanding 
constitutional right, then so could privacy.46  In Douglas’s memorable 
formulation: “[The] specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give 
                                                                                                                          
39 Id. at 480, 485. 
40 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 237 (1985). 
Douglas’s only mention of privacy in the draft came in the concluding paragraph: “‘The prospects of 
police with warrants searching the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of 
contraceptives is repulsive to the idea of privacy and association that make up a goodly part of the 
penumbra of the Constitution and Bill of Rights.’”  Id. at 236 (quoting Douglas’s draft opinion).  
Schwartz writes that Douglas’s sole mention of privacy in the last sentence of his draft “is scarcely 
enough to make it the foundation for any constitutional right of privacy, particularly for the broadside 
right established by the final Griswold opinion.”  Id. at 230.  
41 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).  For a discussion of the Court’s initial recognition of a right of 
association in this case, see Inazu, Strange Origins, supra note 16, at 485.   
42 SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 235 (quoting Douglas’s draft opinion).  
43 Id. at 235. 
44 Id. at 237.  Brennan argued that Douglas’s expanded view of association would extend First 
Amendment protection to the Communist Party.  Id. at 237–38. 
45 Id. at 237.  
46 Id. at 238. 
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them life and substance.”47  
The connection between association and privacy had been established 
in the some of the earliest right of association cases.48  In fact, Justice 
Harlan’s seminal opinion in NAACP v. Alabama had referred to “the vital 
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s 
associations.”49  But associational privacy drew from different values than 
the sense of individual autonomy conveyed by the right “to be let alone.”50  
Privacy in the early right of association cases had more to do with 
protecting the boundaries of group autonomy. As Harlan had argued in 
NAACP v. Alabama, “[i]nviolability of privacy in group association may in 
many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of 
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”51  That 
kind of privacy did not mean “not public”—in fact, groups like the 
NAACP and the Communist Party had actively sought public visibility and 
recognition.  It was in this group context that Douglas had first argued for 
“the need for a pervasive right of privacy against government intrusion” 
and a “right of privacy implicit in the First Amendment [that] creates an 
area into which the Government may not enter.”52   
In Griswold, Douglas linked his earlier understanding of associational 
privacy to marriage by emphasizing the human relationships common to all 
associations: 
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, 
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being 
sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of life, not 
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral 
loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  Yet it is an 
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our 
prior decisions.53   
This relational focus may have drawn an unlikely connection between 
a married couple and the NAACP, but it resisted the kind individualism 
                                                                                                                          
47 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
48 See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 560 (1963) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (noting restrictions set forth by the Fourteenth Amendment that limit states’ efforts “to 
investigate people, their ideas, their activities”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266–67 
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (acknowledging “the right of a citizen to political privacy, as 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
49 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).   
50 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 
(1890) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
51 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462. 
52 Gibson, 372 U.S. at 569–70 (Douglas, J., concurring).  Douglas reiterated these arguments in a 
lecture that he delivered at Brown University which was published subsequently in the Columbia Law 
Review.  William O. Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1361, 1363, 1367 (1963). 
53 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).  
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that equated associational privacy with “the privacy of private life.”54 
Seven years later, Brennan upended that relational focus in Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, which extended Griswold’s holding to unmarried persons desiring 
access to contraception.55  His majority opinion relied heavily on Griswold, 
but not on Douglas’s reasoning:  
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question 
inhered in the marital relationship.  Yet the marital couple is 
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, 
but an association of two individuals each with a separate 
intellectual and emotional makeup.  If the right of privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child.56   
Brennan’s language thus converted an understanding of associational 
freedom rooted in relationships between people to a right of individual 
autonomy.  As H. Jefferson Powell has argued, “Brennan’s reading of 
Griswold turned Douglas’s reasoning on its head,” and Eisenstadt signaled 
“the identification of a radically individualistic liberalism as the moral 
content of American constitutionalism.”57   
B.  Karst’s Intimate Association 
Karst’s 1980 article sought to recover the relational emphasis in 
Griswold that Brennan had abandoned in Eisenstadt.58  He began by noting 
that Douglas had focused specifically on the association of marriage.  Karst 
contended that this language had established a freedom of “‘intimate 
association,’” which he suggested was “a close and familiar personal 
relationship with another that is in some significant way comparable to a 
marriage or family relationship.”59   
                                                                                                                          
54 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 215.   
55 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972). 
56 Id. at 453 (emphasis omitted).  
57 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A 
THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 176, 177 (1993). 
58 Although Karst’s interpretation of Griswold was more nuanced than Brennan’s opinions in 
either Eisenstadt or Roberts, Karst’s own liberal individualism prevented him from fully developing 
Douglas’s non-individualistic arguments about association.  See, e.g., Karst, supra note 37, at 626 
(footnotes omitted) (“[T]he constitutional freedom of intimate association thus serves as an organizing 
principle in a number of associational contexts by promoting awareness of the importance of [certain] 
values to the development of a sense of individuality”); cf. Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, 
Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549, 549 (1993) 
(placing Karst in a class of scholars who “still structure their accounts” on the premise that “[i]lliberal, 
undemocratic beliefs and practices [are] seen only as expressions of ignorance and prejudice, destined 
to marginality by their lack of rational defenses”). 
59 Karst, supra note 37, at 629. 
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The problem with Karst’s argument is its implicit corollary that some 
groups are “nonintimate associations,” and that a constitutionally 
significant line can be drawn between intimate and nonintimate 
associations.  The fundamental critique of both Karst’s argument in this 
subsection and Brennan’s argument in the following subsection is that they 
fail on their own terms to provide a defensible rationale for their line-
drawing.  They fail for the simple reason that all of the values, benefits, 
and attributes that they assign to intimate associations are equally 
applicable to many, if not most, nonintimate associations.60   
Karst at times recognized the broader applicability of his claims.  He 
noted that “[a]n intimate association, like any group, is more than the sum 
of its members; it is a new being, a collective individuality with a life of its 
own.”61  And he wrote that “[o]ne of the points of any freedom of 
association must be to let people make their own definitions of 
community.”62  Yet despite these occasional concessions, Karst repeatedly 
placed special value on the relationships that form intimate associations.   
For example, Karst repeatedly emphasized the importance of “close 
friendship” in intimate association.63  For Karst, it was “plain that the 
values of intimate association may be realized in friendships involving 
neither sexual intimacy nor family ties,” and that “[a]ny view of intimate 
association focused on associational values must therefore include 
friendship . . . .”64  He also tied intimate association to the kinds of bonds 
that form through personal interaction: the “chief value in intimate 
association is the opportunity to satisfy” the “need to love and be loved”;65 
“[t]he opportunity to be cared for by another in an intimate association is 
                                                                                                                          
60 The one distinction that may have been plausible when Karst wrote in 1980 is no longer true 
today.  Karst claimed that intimate association “implies an expectation of access of one person to 
another particular person’s physical presence, some opportunity for face-to-face encounter.”  Id. at 630.  
While physical presence may have been a distinguishing characteristic of intimate associations thirty 
years ago, that is no longer true today.  Many people now bridge physical separation and connect in 
emotionally rich ways with friends and family through online social networking sites, blogs, and video 
conferencing.  Others project their identities or create new ones through virtual representations ranging 
from simple text (like an online profile) to avatars.  Some of these online relationships foster deep 
feelings of intimacy and connectedness.  See, e.g., HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: 
HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (revised ed., 2000); Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1171–72 (2000) (noting that in online forums “pregnant women share 
experiences; the elderly console each other after losing loved ones; patients fighting cancer provide 
information and support; disabled children find friends who do not judge them immediately on their 
disability; users share stories about drug addiction; and gays and lesbians on the brink of coming out 
give each other emotional shelter”). 
61 Karst, supra note 37, at 629 (emphasis added). 
62 Id. at 688 (emphasis added). 
63 Id. at 629 (“The connecting links that distinguish [an intimate] association from, say, 
membership in the PTA may take the form of living in the same quarters, or sexual intimacy, or blood 
ties, or a formal relationship, or some mixtures of these, but in principle the idea of intimate association 
also includes close friendship, with or without any such links.”). 
64 Id. at 629 n.26. 
65 Id. at 632. 
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normally complemented by the opportunity for caring” that requires a 
“personal commitment”;66 “[c]aring for an intimate requires taking the 
trouble to know him and deal with him as a whole person, not just as the 
occupant of a role,” which “limits the number of intimate associations any 
one person can have at any one time, or even in a lifetime.”67 
Karst’s attention to friendship and personal bonds is eminently 
reasonable.  But the potential for and the existence of such close 
friendships can be found in many kinds of associations, including many 
that would not meet the current legal definition of intimate associations.  It 
may well be that attributes of friendship and personal bonds distinguish 
small or local groups from large and impersonal groups such as behemoth 
mailing list organizations.  But surely fraternities, student groups, and local 
chapters of civic associations are capable of producing “close friendships” 
of the kind that Karst describes.   
To be sure, some relationships between members of these groups will 
be superficial and casual.  But this is also true of the relationships that 
constitute many intimate associations.  Karst recognized that protecting the 
values he saw as inherent in intimate association required offering “some 
protection to casual associations as well as lasting ones.”68  In fact, “[o]ne 
reason for extending constitutional protection to casual intimate 
associations is that they may ripen into durable intimate associations.”69  
Karst argued that “[a] doctrinal system extending the freedom of intimate 
association only to cases of enduring commitment would require 
intolerable inquiries into subjects that should be kept private, including 
states of mind.”70  It is hard to understand why these principles would not 
apply equally to nonintimate associations.  
Karst’s other attempts to mark the bounds of intimate association are 
similarly unavailing: 
An intimate association may influence a person’s self-
definition not only by what it says to him but also by what it 
says (or what he thinks it says) to others.71 
. . . . 
 Transient or enduring, chosen or not, our intimate 
associations profoundly affect our personalities and our 
senses of self.  When they are chosen, they take on 
                                                                                                                          
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 634–35. 
68 Id. at 633. 
69 Id.; cf. id. at 688 (“[A]ny constitutional protection of enduring sexual relationships can be 
effective only if it is extended to the choice to engage in casual ones . . . .”).  
70 Id. at 633. 
71 Id. at 636. 
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expressive dimensions as statements defining ourselves.72   
. . . . 
When two people [voluntarily enter into an intimate 
association], they express themselves more eloquently, tell us 
more about who they are and who they hope to be, than they 
ever could do by wearing armbands or carrying red flags.73 
. . . . 
First Amendment doctrine cautions us to be sensitive to the 
need to protect intimate associations that are unconventional 
or that may offend a majority of the community.74 
Each of these claims applies with equal force if we remove the 
adjective “intimate.”  Some associations and associative acts will lack 
significance for some people, but that is true for both intimate and 
nonintimate associations.  The extent to which expression, self-definition, 
and unconventional norms unfold in a group’s practices is not contingent 
upon whether the group is an intimate association.   
Some of Karst’s conceptual problems likely arose because he was not 
explicitly attempting to distinguish intimate from nonintimate associations.  
He appears to focus on trying to develop a category of intimate association 
as an alternative to the then-nascent right of privacy,75 and to use the right 
of intimate association to advance legal protections for homosexual 
relationships.76  Today, these particular goals are unlikely to be advanced 
by the right of intimate association.77  We need look no further than 
                                                                                                                          
72 Id. at 637. 
73 Id. at 654. 
74 Id. at 658. 
75 Karst regarded the freedom of intimate association as on “the cutting edge” of “the current 
revival of substantive due process.”  Id. at 665.  In contrast, he believed that “[c]alling the rights in 
Griswold and Roe rights of privacy invites the rejection of comparable claims on the ground that, after 
all, they do not rest on any concerns about control over the disclosure of information.”  Id. at 664. 
76 See, e.g., id. at 672 (“[A]s I have argued in connection with the prohibition on homosexual 
conduct, there is no legitimacy in an effort by the state to advance one view of morals by preventing the 
expression of another view.”); id. at 682 (“By now it will be obvious that the freedom of intimate 
association extends to homosexual associations as it does to heterosexual ones.”); id. at 685 (“The chief 
importance of the freedom of intimate association as an organizing principle in the area of homosexual 
relationships is that it lets us see how closely homosexual associations resemble marriage and other 
heterosexual associations.”).  
77 Toni Massaro has recognized the “problems” with relying on intimate association to advance 
gay rights: “While a robust freedom of association principle promises greater freedom to gay men and 
lesbians to choose their companions, it also promises greater freedom to others to choose not to 
associate with gay men and lesbians.”  Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 45, 66 (1996).  Massaro identifies a risk in gay rights scholars advocating for neutral applications 
of the right of association: “Unless we aim for an asymmetrical version of freedom of association, or 
one that is zoned in a manner similar to that of freedom of expression, this call to neutrality, taken 
alone, may be the riskiest approach of all.”  Id.  But see Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of 
Intimate Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 269, 311–12 (2006) 
(arguing for a greater role for intimate association in gay rights). 
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Lawrence v. Texas,78 the Supreme Court’s overruling of its decision in 
Bowers v. Hardwick.79  Bowers drew two dissents, one from Justice 
Stevens that emphasized Griswold’s liberty arguments,80 and one from 
Justice Blackmun that drew upon Griswold’s intimate association 
arguments and twice cited Karst’s article.81  Lawrence relied on Stevens’s 
dissent and never mentioned the right of intimate association.82 
C.  Brennan’s Intimate Association 
Brennan’s Roberts opinion never cites Karst’s article, but the 
intellectual debt is apparent.83  And while Karst had focused on increasing 
protections for intimate associations, Brennan’s use of the category of 
intimate association degraded protections for nonintimate ones.84  He 
                                                                                                                          
78 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
79 478 U.S. 186 (1986).   
80 Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
81 Id. at 204–05, 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Karst, supra note 37, at 627, 637). 
82 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have been 
controlling in Bowers and should control here.”).  Nancy Marcus has suggested that “principles of 
intimate association underlie the Lawrence decision” and that “Lawrence is the first actual affirmation 
of a litigant’s intimate associational rights by the Supreme Court since Roberts.”  Marcus, supra note 
77, at 303, 308.  Laura Rosenbury and Jennifer Rothman argue similarly that the majority’s “shift from 
sex acts to relationships aligns Lawrence with the right to intimate association already articulated by 
the Court in other contexts.”  Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 
59 EMORY L.J. 809, 826 (2010).  These claims seem undermined by the lack of any mention of 
intimate association in the Lawrence opinion, particularly in light of the fact that the Justices had before 
them Blackmun’s Bowers dissent and arguments about intimate association from the Lawrence 
Petitioners.  See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 
WL 152352 at *11–12, *15 & n.9 (citing Karst’s article, discussing Roberts’s category of intimate 
association, and asserting that “[t]he adult couple whose shared life includes sexual intimacy is 
undoubtedly one of the most important and profound forms of intimate association”); Reply Brief of 
Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 1098835 at *5 (“The 
relationship of an adult couple—whether heterosexual or gay—united by sexual intimacy is the very 
paradigm of an intimate association in which one finds ‘emotional enrichment’ and ‘independently . . . 
define[s] one’s identity,’ and it is protected as such from ‘unwarranted state interference.’” (quoting 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–20 (1984))).  
83 The similarities between Karst’s article and Brennan’s opinion have gone relatively unnoticed.  
Among the few articles making the connection are Marcus, supra note 77, at 278, and Collin O’Connor 
Udell, Intimate Association: Resurrecting a Hybrid Right, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 231 (1998).  Udell 
suggests that Roberts “lifted the right to intimate association from Karst’s article.”  Id. at 232. 
84 Post-Roberts cases have made clear that most associations are nonintimate, and few courts have 
extended the category of intimate association beyond family relationships.  See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. 
City of Dall., 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990) (holding that patrons of a motel which limited room rentals to 
ten hours did not have an intimate relationship protected by the Constitution), overruled on other 
grounds by City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004); City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 
490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989) (holding that dance hall patrons “are not engaged in the sort of ‘intimate human 
relationships’ referred to in Roberts” that give rise to the protections of intimate association); Bd. of 
Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987) (holding that the relationship 
among Rotary Club members is not the type of intimate relationship that merits constitutional 
protection); Poirier v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 558 F.3d 92, 96 (1st Cir. 2009) (refusing to extend 
protections of intimate association to “[t]he unmarried cohabitation of adults”); Borden v. Sch. Dist. of 
Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 173 (3d Cir. 2008) (“While the Supreme Court has held that the 
Constitution protects certain relationships, those protected relationships require a closeness that is not 
present between a high school football coach and his team.”); Swanson v. City of Bruce, 105 F. App’x 
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began by noting: “[C]ertain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical 
role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and 
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act 
as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State.”85  
This passage attempts to draw the reader into a kind of Tocquevillean ethos 
in which intimate associations at once facilitate support for “the Nation” 
and resistance to “the State.”86  But Brennan’s argument lacks coherence 
and specificity.  What is the difference between Nation and State?  What 
are the national culture (singular) and national traditions (plural) brought 
about by “shared ideals and beliefs”?  How do personal bonds “foster 
diversity” and act as “critical buffers” from state power?  More to the 
point, why are these functions unique to intimate associations?  If 
Brennan’s argument is that intimate associations sustain some kind of 
shared culture—“cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs”—
then why can’t nonintimate associations also serve as “schools of 
democracy”?87  Conversely, if he means to position intimate associations 
as “mediating structures”88 between individuals and the state—“foster[ing] 
diversity and act[ing] as critical buffers”—then don’t some of the largest—
and least intimate—groups have the greatest capacity to resist the state? 
The passage also belies a more troubling vagueness.  It contains an 
irresolvable tension that doesn’t let the reader know whether Brennan is 
ultimately prioritizing the state, the non-state group, or the individual, and 
                                                                                                                          
540, 542 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The tight fellowship among police officers, precious though it may be, does 
not include ‘such deep attachments and commitments of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs’ or personal 
aspects of officers’ lives sufficient to constitute an intimate relationship.” (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 
620)); Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 442 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding 
that a college fraternity is not an intimate association); Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 919 
F.2d 183, 198 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that intimate association is unlikely to cover religious groups 
because “[m]ost religious groups do not exhibit the distinctive attributes the Court has identified as 
helpful in determining whether the freedom of association is implicated”); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 
F.2d 1195, 1205 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a brother-in-law relationship is not protected as an 
intimate association).  But see Anderson v. City of LaVergne, 371 F.3d 879, 882 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(assuming, for summary judgment purposes, that a dating relationship between two police officers 
qualified as an intimate association because the two were monogamous, had lived together, and were 
romantically and sexually involved); Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1039–40 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that some types of personal friendships may constitute intimate associations); La. Debating 
and Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1497–98 (5th Cir. 1995) (extending the right 
of “private association” to a private club).   
85 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–19 (1984). 
86 The textual tension in some ways replicates the strain between stability and pluralism of mid-
twentieth century liberalism and the ways in which scholars like Robert Dahl and David Truman 
appropriate Tocqueville.  See generally Inazu, Strange Origins, supra note 16.  
87 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 511 (Henry Reeve trans. 1899).  Indeed, 
as Nancy Rosenblum has argued: “The onus for cultivating the moral dispositions of liberal democratic 
citizens falls heavily on voluntary groups such as the Jaycees and their myriad counterparts.”  Nancy 
Rosenblum, Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect, and the Dynamic of Exclusion, in 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 75, 76 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) [hereinafter Rosenblum, Compelled 
Association].   
88 PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL 
SOCIETY 51–63 (2d ed. 1996). 
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the answer to that question matters a great deal.  From the rest of his 
opinion and his broader jurisprudence, we might infer that Brennan wants 
to privilege the individual, then the state, and lastly, the group.  But if that 
is where his argument rests, then some language—“critical buffers,” 
“traditions,” “shared ideals”—becomes much harder for him to employ in 
an unqualified sense.   
Brennan next enlisted notions of liberty and autonomy in his defense 
of intimate association, embracing the individualistic gloss that his 
Eisenstadt opinion had cast on Griswold: “[T]he constitutional shelter 
afforded [intimate associations] reflects the realization that individuals 
draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.  
Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore 
safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity that is central 
to any concept of liberty.”89  These phrases—“emotional enrichment,” 
“[defining] one’s identity,” and “[the] concept of liberty”—again call to 
mind lofty ideals, but their meanings are imprecise.90  As before, Brennan 
fails to explain why his reasoning extends only to intimate associations.  
People form close ties with others through all kinds of associations.  Some 
lifelong friendships emerge from within nonintimate associations; some 
intimate associations collapse in a matter of months.91  Self-definition also 
comes in myriad forms of association—one’s decision to join the ACLU or 
make a financial contribution to Greenpeace can speak volumes about his 
or her identity. 
Like Karst, Brennan fails to offer a convincing rationale for privileging 
intimate associations over nonintimate ones.  His theoretical anchor is the 
residue of Eisenstadt that supplants the inherently relational aspects of 
association with an individualistic notion of privacy.  Intimate association 
is reduced to intimate individualism.92 
                                                                                                                          
89 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. 
90 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of liberty 
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.”). 
91 Or hours.  See, e.g., Britney Spears Sheds Another Husband, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at E2 
(referencing Spears’s annulment of marriage to her childhood friend, Jason Alexander, fifty-five hours 
after they wed). 
92 The constitutional protections offered by intimate association are today almost completely 
redundant of those found in the right of privacy.  See, e.g., Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933, 
937 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The freedom of intimate association ‘receives protection as a fundamental 
element of personal liberty,’ and as such is protected by the due process clauses.” (quoting Roberts, 468 
U.S. at 618)); Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 385 F.3d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Whether called a 
right to intimate association, or a right to privacy, the point is similar: ‘choices to enter into and 
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State 
because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our 
constitutional scheme.’” (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617–18)); City of Bremerton v. Widell, 51 P.3d 
733, 741 (Wash. 2002) (en banc) (“[O]ur own cases have held that the right of intimate association 
stems from the right of privacy, which normally applies only to familial relationships, and ‘extend[s] 
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IV.  EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION 
The second category that Brennan announced in Roberts was 
expressive association.  Like intimate association, it has distant echoes of 
Douglas’s Griswold opinion and the Court’s earliest cases on the right of 
association.93  But it is shaped even more determinatively by decisions that 
emerged out of the Civil Rights Era.  This section assesses the doctrinal 
developments in these cases and then examines the ways in which Brennan 
adopted them in Roberts.  
A.  Civil Rights and the Right to Exclude 
Douglas had argued in Griswold that the right of association “includes 
the right to express one’s attitudes or philosophies by membership in a 
group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means.”94  In other words, 
as he had asserted in a dissent four years earlier, “[j]oining is one method 
of expression.”95  Seven years after Griswold,  Douglas insisted that the 
right of association included the right not to associate:  
The associational rights which our system honors permit all 
white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed.  
They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs 
to be established.  Government may not tell a man or woman 
who his or her associates must be.  The individual can be as 
selective as he desires.96   
For Douglas, the First Amendment “precludes government from interfering 
with private clubs or groups.”97 
Douglas’s defense of the “right to exclude” came in the midst of the 
Civil Rights Era when racist white groups repeatedly invoked the right of 
association in an attempt to curb integration.  In Herbert Wechsler’s 
infamous formulation, “integration force[d] an association upon those for 
                                                                                                                          
only as far as the principles of substantive due process permit.’” (quoting Bedford v. Sugarman, 772 
P.2d 486, 495 (Wash. 1989))).  
93 Karst may have also played a role in shaping the category of expressive association by 
recasting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson as a case of “political association.”  Karst, supra note 
37, at 656–57 n.149 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).  Harlan’s 
opinion in the earlier case had contained no such adjective.  In recent decades, the Court appears to 
have developed a distinct right of “political association” in a line of cases involving closed and semi-
closed primaries.  E.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 592 (2005); Tashjian v. Republican Party of 
Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986). 
94 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
95 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 882 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
96 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179–80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 179; see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) 
(“Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the constitutional right of every person to 
close his home or club to any person . . . solely on the basis of personal prejudices including race.”). 
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whom it [was] unpleasant or repugnant.”98  Wechsler’s objection made no 
sense in public settings.99 But Charles Black’s response to Wechsler was 
equally unavailing.  Black argued that the freedom not to associate “exists 
only at home; in public, we have to associate with anybody who has a right 
to be there.”100   In our society, the boundary between public and private is 
not, and never has been, the home.  People live their private lives outside 
of the home in religious communities, civic groups, social clubs, and a 
panoply of other collective enterprises that do not border on “public” in the 
sense that Black employed the term.   
The critical question for the right of association during the Civil Rights 
Era was the extent to which it could justify private discrimination by 
whites against African Americans, and the issue was far more complicated 
than either Wechsler or Black suggested. Three important legal 
developments provided an answer to this question: (1) the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964; (2) the Court’s 1968 decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.;101 
and (3) the Court’s 1976 decision in Runyon v. McCrary.102  
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited racial discrimination 
in places of “public accommodation.”103  The legislation encompassed 
inns, restaurants, gas stations, and places of entertainment but exempted 
private clubs and other establishments “not in fact open to the public.”104  
Five years later, the Court made clear that sham attempts to meet the 
private club exception would not prevail.105   
The second important development for the right of association during 
the Civil Rights Era was the Court’s 1968 decision in Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer, which interpreted a Reconstruction statute, the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, to bar racial discrimination in the sale or lease of private property.106  
                                                                                                                          
98 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 
(1959). 
99 Although Wechsler directed part of his critique against Brown v. Board  of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954), it was implausible to argue that segregationists had a freedom to associate (or a right to 
exclude) in situations where the government provided a public good or service.  Cf. ANDREW 
KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 179 (1996) (“Wechsler’s objection to 
Brown is silly with respect to public schools . . . .”).  
100 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 429 
(1960). The exchange between Wechsler and Black is recounted in KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 
6, at 17. 
101 392 U.S. 409, 444 (1968).   
102 427 U.S. 160 (1976).   
103 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–2000h-6 
(2006)); cf. Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. 
REV. 781, 816 (2007) (“The statute’s extension of the civil rights norm to private conduct marks a 
striking shift from constitutional requirements that pertain only to a state actor.”). 
104 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b), (e).   
105 Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301–02 (1969) (rejecting an amusement park’s contention that it 
was a private club exempt from the Act because it charged patrons a twenty-five cent “membership” 
fee and distributed “membership” cards). 
106 Jones, 392 U.S. at 444.  As George Rutherglen notes, the Court’s interpretive analysis “has 
proven to be controversial,” but “the extension of the 1866 Act to private discrimination in Jones was 
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The Court reasoned that the 1866 Act reached even private discrimination 
because “the exclusion of Negroes from white communities” reflected “the 
badges and incidents of slavery.”107  It extended the reach of Jones to 
membership in a community park and playground in Sullivan v. Little 
Hunting Park, Inc.,108 and a private swimming pool in Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Recreation Ass’n.109  Jones, Sullivan, and Tillman all involved sales 
or leases related to real property covered under the Fair Housing Act of 
1968.110  The Court’s reliance on a somewhat strained interpretation of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 rather than a straightforward application of the 
Fair Housing Act prompted Justice Harlan (joined by Justice White and 
Chief Justice Burger) to dissent in Sullivan, noting that the “vague and 
open-ended” construction of section 1982 risked “grave constitutional 
issues should [that authority] be extended too far into some types of private 
discrimination.”111 
These two developments—the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Court’s decision in Jones—represented major steps toward ending 
segregation.  Both also constrained group autonomy.  But few people today 
object to these constraints along racial or any other lines—the idea that 
owners of businesses open to the public or sellers of private homes should 
have a constitutional right to discriminate finds few defenders.  In other 
words, if the constraints on group autonomy were limited to these 
applications, contemporary debates would be virtually nonexistent. 
More complicated questions arose from the Court’s line of cases 
addressing private school segregation that culminated in its 1976 decision 
in Runyon v. McCrary.112  These private segregated schools, many of 
which emerged in the wake of the Court’s integration of public schools, 
represented a key battleground of the Civil Rights Era.113  Preliminary 
challenges focused on government financial support, and in the late 1960s, 
the Court affirmed a number of decisions enjoining state tuition grants to 
                                                                                                                          
both much more acceptable and much less radical” because “the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had 
legitimatized federal regulation of private discrimination.”  George Rutherglen, Civil Rights in Private 
Schools: The Surprising Story of Runyon v. McCrary, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 119 (Myriam E. Gilles 
& Risa L. Goluboff eds., 2008). 
107 Jones, 392 U.S. at 441–42. 
108 396 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1969). 
109 410 U.S. 431, 432, 437 (1973). 
110 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006).  In Sullivan, the Court characterized Little Hunting Park’s 
exclusion of African Americans as “a device functionally comparable to a racially restrictive 
covenant.”  396 U.S. at 236.  In Tillman, a unanimous Court concluded that “[t]he structure and 
practices of Wheaton-Haven . . . are indistinguishable from those of Little Haven Park.”  410 U.S. at 
438. 
111 Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 241, 248 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
112 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).   
113 On the emergence of segregated private schools in the late 1960s and early 1970s, see, for 
example, DAVID NEVIN AND ROBERT E. BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT: SEGREGATIONIST 
ACADEMIES IN THE SOUTH (1976).  
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students attending racially discriminatory private schools.114  In 1973, the 
Court concluded in Norwood v. Harrison that state-funded textbook loans 
to students attending these schools were “not legally distinguishable” from 
tuition grants.115  Norwood was the Court’s first explicit consideration of 
the conflict between anti-discrimination norms and the right of association.  
Summarizing recent legislative and judicial developments, Chief Justice 
Burger noted that “although the Constitution does not proscribe private 
bias, it places no value on discrimination.”116  
Shortly after Norwood, the Justices addressed the use of public 
recreational facilities by private segregated schools in Gilmore v. City of 
Montgomery.117  Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion noted that in contrast 
to the relatively easy question of integrating public facilities and programs, 
“[t]he problem of private group use is much more complex.”118  The 
dispositive question was whether the use of public facilities made the 
government “a joint participant in the challenged activity.”119  The Court 
concluded that municipal recreational facilities, including parks, 
playgrounds, athletic facilities, amphitheaters, museums, and zoos, were 
sufficiently akin to “generalized governmental services” like traditional 
state monopolies, such as electricity, water, and police and fire 
protection.120  Accordingly, the use of these facilities by private groups that 
discriminated on the basis of race did not rise to the level of government 
endorsement of discriminatory practices.121  But Blackmun went even 
further, noting that the exclusion of a discriminatory group from public 
facilities would violate the group’s freedom of association.122  He asserted 
that “[t]he freedom to associate applies to the beliefs we share, and to those 
we consider reprehensible” and “tends to produce the diversity of opinion 
that oils the machinery of democratic government and insures peaceful, 
                                                                                                                          
114 E.g., Brown v. S.C. Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199, 202–03 (D.S.C. 1968), aff’d per curiam, 
393 U.S. 222 (1968); Poindexter v. La. Fin. Assistance Comm’n, 275 F. Supp. 833, 835 (E.D. La. 
1967), aff’d per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968). 
115 413 U.S. 455, 463 (1973). 
116 Id. at 463.  Burger concluded that simply because “the Constitution may compel toleration of 
private discrimination in some circumstances does not mean that it requires state support for such 
discrimination.” Id.  Additionally, “even some private discrimination is subject to special remedial 
legislation in certain circumstances under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment . . . .”  Id. at 470. 
117 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 567 (1974).  The decision came after repeated 
instances of Montgomery’s blatant disregard of mandates to integrate its public facilities.  Id. at 569–
72. 
118 Id. at 572. 
119 Id. at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
120 Id. at 574. 
121 Blackmun observed that the result might be different if “the city or other governmental entity 
rations otherwise freely accessible recreational facilities” in a manner suggestive of discriminatory 
intent.  Id.   
122 Id. at 575.  (quoting Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179–80 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting)). 
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orderly change.”123  At the same time, he cautioned that “the very exercise 
of the freedom to associate by some may serve to infringe that freedom for 
others.  Invidious discrimination takes its own toll on the freedom to 
associate, and it is not subject to affirmative constitutional protection when 
it involves state action.”124  
Two years later, the Court retreated from both its defense of the right 
of association and its state action requirement in Runyon, a decision that 
construed another provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to preclude 
racial discrimination by “private, commercially operated, nonsectarian 
schools.”125  Rejecting the suggestion that the legislation “d[id] not reach 
private acts of racial discrimination,”126 Justice Stewart wrote: 
From [the] principle [of the freedom of association] it 
may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to 
send their children to educational institutions that promote 
the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and that the 
children have an equal right to attend such institutions.  But it 
does not follow that the practice of excluding racial 
minorities from such institutions is also protected by the 
same principle.127 
Stewart buttressed his argument with a truncated quotation from 
Norwood.  Burger had written in Norwood that, “although the Constitution 
does not proscribe private bias, it places no value on discrimination.”128  
Stewart’s quotation omitted Burger’s prefatory clause and asserted: “As 
the Court stated in Norwood[,] . . . the Constitution . . . places no value on 
discrimination.”129  The abbreviated language stood for a broader legal 
principle.  Norwood had prevented government subsidization of a 
disfavored social practice.  Runyon precluded the practice itself and 
marked the first time that Court had in the interest of anti-discrimination 
norms denied the right of existence to a private group with neither ties to 
state action nor meeting the definition of a public accommodation.130  
Runyon’s symbolic and substantive importance is beyond challenge.  
The decision made clear that the Court understood the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 “to reach all intentional racial discrimination, public and private, that 
interfered with the right to contract,” and that it trumped the right of 
                                                                                                                          
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976). 
126 Id. at 173. 
127 Id. at 176 (emphasis omitted). 
128 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973) (emphasis added).  
129 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
130 See Rutherglen, supra note 106, at 111 (Runyon “subordinated private choice to civil rights 
policy and extended federal law beyond the limitations of the state action doctrine”). 
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association.131  That core holding has been undisturbed and was, in fact, 
codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.132  Few people today believe that 
private schools ought to have a constitutional right to exclude African 
Americans, and the decision as a symbolic marker for civil rights and 
racial integration is indisputable.   
Runyon’s doctrinal significance is less clear, and it is on this doctrinal 
level that the case maintains its greatest significance for contested 
questions of group autonomy today.  Two moves in particular are open to 
question, and both of them are mirrored eight years later in Roberts’s much 
different context.  The first is the argument that forced inclusion of 
unwanted members does not change the core expression of a 
discriminatory group.  Justice Stewart quoted with approval the Fourth 
Circuit’s conclusion that “‘there is no showing that discontinuance of [the] 
discriminatory admission practices would inhibit in any way the teaching 
in these schools of any ideas or dogma.”’133  If we set aside the political 
and moral context of Runyon and examine the argument on its own terms, 
it is implausible to claim that forcing a school to abandon its racially 
discriminatory admissions policy would not inhibit its teaching of racist 
ideas and dogma.134  The United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit made a related observation about the message conveyed by a 
group’s very existence in upholding the associational rights of a gay 
student group:  
[B]eyond the specific communications at [its] events is the 
                                                                                                                          
131 John Hope Franklin, The Civil Rights Act of 1866 Revisited, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1138 
(1990).    
132 See Rutherglen, supra note 106, at 111, 122 (noting that in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 
491 U.S. 164, 171–75 (1989), the Court decided against overruling Runyon and that Patterson was 
superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, “which amended section 1981 to make clear that it covered 
all aspects of contractual relations and applied to all contracts”).  
133 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176 (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975)).    
134 See KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at 19 (“If the schools are integrated, it is hard to 
imagine that this will not have some effect on the ideas taught.”); William Buss, Discrimination by 
Private Clubs, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 815, 831 (1989) (“[T]he assertion that forcing a school to admit black 
children will ‘in no way’ inhibit the school’s intended message that racial integration is bad proves too 
much to swallow.  Just as government-mandated school segregation conveys a powerful message that 
black people are unworthy to associate with whites, state-mandated integration conveys a powerful 
message that blacks and whites are human beings with equal worth and dignity.  That message must 
blunt any merely verbal message, taught in the school, that segregation is a good thing.” (footnote 
omitted)).  Some scholars have nevertheless left Stewart’s reasoning here unchallenged, arguing instead 
that the defendants in Runyon never contended that they should be protected as “expressive 
associations,” notwithstanding the fact that the Court had yet to recognize such a category.  See, e.g., 
David E. Bernstein, The Right of Expressive Association and Private Universities’ Racial Preferences 
and Speech Codes, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619, 626–27 (2001) (“[A] close reading of Runyon and 
the briefs filed in it reveal that Runyon was not an ‘expressive association’ case.  The defendants in 
Runyon made what amounts to a short, throw-away argument that their right to ‘freedom of 
association,’ floating somewhere in the penumbral ether of the Constitution, was violated by compelled 
integration.  However, the defendants did not make an expressive association claim grounded in the 
First Amendment.  They did not argue in their briefs that the school’s ability to promote segregation 
would be compromised, nor did they provide evidence at trial on that issue.”). 
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basic “message” [Gay Students Organization] seeks to 
convey—that homosexuals exist, that they feel repressed by 
existing laws and attitudes, that they wish to emerge from 
their isolation, and that public understanding of their attitudes 
and problems is desirable for society.135 
Stewart’s second questionable doctrinal move was his distinction 
between the act of discrimination and the message of discrimination.  In 
Stewart’s view, the right of association protected only the latter, and the 
exclusion of African Americans counted only as the former.  In other 
words, the right of association only extended to the expression of ideas, 
and exclusion wasn’t expression.  But that argument makes an arbitrary 
distinction between act and message that could be applied to any form of 
symbolic expression.  It tells us nothing about the value or harm of the 
expression itself.136 
B.  Brennan’s Expressive Association 
Brennan’s Roberts opinion characterized expressive association as “for 
the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First 
Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and 
the exercise of religion.”137  The Court had “long understood as implicit in 
the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a 
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of 
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”138 
                                                                                                                          
135 Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 661 (1st Cir. 1974). 
136 Stewart soon reiterated this narrower understanding of the right of association in cases beyond 
the Civil Rights context.  Writing for the majority in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, a 1977 case 
involving an “agency shop” arrangement for state government employees, he described “the freedom of 
an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas.”  431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) 
(emphasis added). And four years later, writing for the Court in Democratic Party of the United States 
v. Wisconsin, a case involving political parties, Stewart referred to the “freedom to gather in association 
for the purpose of advancing shared beliefs.”  450 U.S. 107, 121 (1981) (emphasis added).  That same 
year, Burger echoed Stewart’s view in Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley.  454 U.S. 290 (1981) 
(emphasis added). Although acknowledging that “the practice of persons sharing common views 
banding together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American political process,” 
Burger asserted that the real value of association was “that by collective effort individuals can make 
their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or lost.”  Id. at 294 (emphasis 
added).  Three years later, Brennan adopted Stewart’s distinction between belief and practice and 
rendered association wholly instrumental to other First Amendment freedoms.  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). 
137 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.  
138 Id. at 622.  Lower courts have generally adopted Brennan’s instrumental gloss on expressive 
association.  See, e.g., Schultz v. Wilson, 304 F. App’x 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A social group is not 
protected unless it engages in expressive activity such as taking a stance on an issue of public, political, 
social, or cultural importance.”); Willis v. Town of Marshall, 426 F.3d 251, 261 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[A] 
constitutionally protected right to associate depends upon the existence of an activity that is itself 
protected by the First Amendment.”); Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 418 F.3d 36, 50 
(1st Cir. 2005) (“[I]n a free speech case, an association’s expressive purpose may pertain to a wide 
array of ends (including economic ends), but the embedded associational right protects only collective 
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Despite his instrumental characterization of expressive association, 
Brennan proposed an ostensibly protective legal test: “Infringements on 
[the right of expressive association] may be justified by regulations 
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of 
ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive 
of associational freedoms.”139   
The language of “compelling state interests, unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas” calls to mind the strict scrutiny standard established 
in other areas of the Court’s First Amendment law.140  But the reference to 
“means significantly less restrictive” differs from the usual strict scrutiny 
language of “least restrictive means.”141 On closer examination, what 
resembles a strict scrutiny test might actually invert the presumption 
favoring the protected First Amendment activity to one that favors the 
government.  Brennan’s phrasing suggests that a government regulation 
that is to a large extent—but not significantly more—restrictive of 
associational freedoms than a less onerous regulation would survive the 
test.  Although Brennan elsewhere intimated that he was applying strict 
                                                                                                                          
speech and expressive conduct in pursuit of those ends; it does not cover concerted action that lacks an 
expressive purpose.” (internal citations omitted)); McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 
1994) (“The right of expressive association . . . is protected by the First Amendment as a necessary 
corollary of the rights that the amendment protects by its terms. . . .  [A] plaintiff . . . can obtain special 
protection for an asserted associational right if she can demonstrate . . . that the purpose of the 
association is to engage in activities independently protected by the First Amendment.” (internal 
citations omitted)); Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 199 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The 
[Supreme] Court has not yet defined the parameters of the right to associate for religious purposes, but 
it has made it clear that the right to expressive association is a derivative right, which has been implied 
from the First Amendment in order to assure that those rights expressly secured by that amendment can 
be meaningfully exercised.  Thus, there is no constitutional right to associate for a purpose that is not 
protected by the First Amendment.” (internal citations omitted)).  But see Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. 
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 274 F.3d 377, 396 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that the First 
Amendment “protects the entertainers and audience members’ right to free expressive association” at 
an adult establishment because “[t]hey are certainly engaged in a collective effort on behalf of shared 
goals” and “[t]he dancers and customers work together as speaker and audience to create an erotic, 
sexually-charged atmosphere, and although society may not find that a particularly worthy goal, it is a 
shared one nonetheless”). 
139 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.  Brennan also emphasized that “[t]here can be no clearer example of 
an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group 
to accept members it does not desire.”  Id.  
140 The most commonly asserted elements of the test require that a statute subject to strict scrutiny 
must be narrowly tailored and use the least restrictive means to further a compelling government 
interest.  See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) 
(summarizing the strict scrutiny test); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 
U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (finding that protecting the psychological and physical wellbeing of minors is a 
compelling government interest, but that the government must still choose the least restrictive means to 
further said interest); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 786 (1978) (noting that a state-
imposed restriction on corporate speech cannot stand in the absence of a compelling state interest). 
141 It is worth noting that in the twenty-five years since Roberts, the Court has never elaborated on 
its “significantly less restrictive” language and has cited it only four times, twice in footnotes.  See 
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 (2010) (quoting Roberts for this language); 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (same); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 
U.S. 377, 388 n.3 (2000) (same); Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 303 n.11 
(1986) (same).  
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scrutiny,142 his only formulation of the legal test proposed a different 
standard, and, unsurprisingly, some courts have construed Roberts as 
intending something less than strict scrutiny.143 
C.  The Problems with “Nonexpressive” Association 
Brennan’s rendering of the constitutional test for regulations impinging 
upon expressive association was not the only problem with his analysis.  
His category of expressive association implied that some associations were 
“nonexpressive.”144  The problems with this line-drawing are not merely 
doctrinal—they are philosophical as well.145  The purported distinction 
between expressive and nonexpressive association fails to recognize that: 
(1) all associations have expressive potential; (2) meaning is dynamic; and 
(3) meaning is subject to more than one interpretation.  These three claims 
rely on hermeneutical arguments whose full consideration exceeds the 
scope of this Article and which are addressed here in summary fashion.146  
                                                                                                                          
142 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626 (noting that the state achieved its interest through “the least 
restrictive means”); id. at 628 (finding that the “incidental abridgment” of protected speech “[was] not 
greater than [was] necessary”).  Four Justices later equated the Roberts test of “means significantly less 
restrictive” to strict scrutiny.  See Dale, 530 U.S. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that 
eliminating discrimination is a compelling government interest, and observing that the court in Roberts 
“held that Minnesota’s law [was] the least restrictive means of achieving [the state’s compelling] 
interest”).  Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens’s dissent.  Id. at 663.  But in 
some ways, Dale only adds to the ambiguity of the test the Court applies in freedom of association 
cases.  See id. at 658–59 (rejecting “the intermediate standard of review enunciated in United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968),” but noting that under the proper analysis, “the associational interest in 
freedom of expression has been set on one side of the scale, and the State’s interest on the other”). 
143 See, e.g., Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Roberts does not require the 
government to exhaust every possible means of furthering its interest; rather, the government must 
show only that its interest ‘cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of 
associational freedoms.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623)); Chi Iota Colony of 
Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The mere fact 
that the associational interest asserted is recognized by the First Amendment does not necessarily mean 
that a regulation which burdens that interest must satisfy strict scrutiny.”); Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. 
Educ., 809 F.2d 1546, 1559 n.26 (11th Cir. 1987) (describing a “balancing of interests” (quoting 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623)); Every Nation Campus Ministries v. Achtenberg, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 
1083 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (“‘[S]tate action that burdens a group’s ability to engage in expressive 
association [need not] always be subject to strict scrutiny, even if the group seeks to engage in 
expressive association through a limited public forum.’” (quoting Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 
634, 652 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fisher, J., concurring))); cf. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. 
Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 247 (3d. Cir. 2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (describing Roberts as having 
announced a “balance-of-interests test”).   
144 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence explicitly refers to “nonexpressive association.”  See Roberts, 
468 U.S. at 638 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court’s case law recognizes radically different 
constitutional protections for expressive and nonexpressive associations.”). 
145 Cf. Epstein, supra note 27, at 122 (arguing that the distinction between expressive and 
nonexpressive association “is indefensible both as a matter of political theory and constitutional law”).   
146 For the kind of argument on which these claims are based, see generally LUDWIG 
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell & Mott, 
Ltd. 3d ed. 1958) (1953). 
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1.  The Ubiquity of Expressive Association 
The first problem with “nonexpressive association” is that every 
association—and every associational act—has expressive potential.  
Expressive meaning comes through the performance of communal acts, 
and communicative possibility exists in joining, excluding, gathering, 
proclaiming, engaging, or not engaging.147  Once an association is 
stipulated between two or more people, almost any associative act by those 
people—when consciously undertaken as members of the association—has 
expressive potential reflective of that association.148  
Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk reject this capacious 
understanding of expressive meaning in their consideration of Dale.149  For 
example, they assert that “[t]he membership of an association is not 
inherently expressive in the way that the membership of a parade  
is . . . .”150  But this is not always the case—membership in the Ku Klux 
Klan likely conveys greater expressivism than marching in the Macy’s 
Thanksgiving Day Parade.151   
Chemerinsky and Fisk make a related error when they propose a 
speech-based remedy for the Boy Scouts in a world in which the Court had 
decided Dale differently.  They argue that even if the Scouts had been 
forced to include James Dale as part of its association, 
[it] easily could proclaim to the world that it is anti-gay and 
that it was accepting gay scoutleaders, like James Dale, 
because the law required it to do so.  In other words, the Boy 
Scouts could use the forced inclusion of homosexuals as the 
occasion for making clear its anti-gay message, and that the 
inclusion of Dale was a result of legal compulsion and not a 
                                                                                                                          
147 Cf. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Even the training of outdoor survival 
skills or participation in community service might become expressive when the activity is intended to 
develop good morals, reverence, patriotism, and a desire for self-improvement.”). 
148 The claim is intentionally broad—it is difficult to envision any associative act that lacks 
expressive potential.  William Marshall posits a counterexample: “Tom and Fred walking down the 
street is, in no meaningful sense, expression.”  Marshall, supra note 36, at 77.  But as long as Tom and 
Fred’s stroll reflects a conscious decision to walk with one another, then the act of walking may 
express a kind of shared (though perhaps fleeting) affiliation.  The meaning of that expression will vary 
based upon the surrounding circumstances.  Consider, for example, the expressive meaning if Tom is 
black and Fred is white and they are walking merrily down the main street of a small southern town in 
the 1950s.     
149 Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 600–04 (2001).   
150 Id. at 604.  Chemerinsky and Fisk make the comment in an attempt to distinguish Dale from 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 578 (1995).  
Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 149, at 604.  
151 Cf. Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 149, at 599 (“[T]he Klan likely could exclude African 
Americans or the Nazi party could exclude Jews because discrimination is a key aspect of their 
message.”).   
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matter of condoning his sexual orientation.152 
Chemerinsky and Fisk’s proposal assumes that policy statements made 
by the Boy Scouts will perfectly mitigate the direct and indirect expressive 
effects of Dale’s forced inclusion.  But once we recognize that expressive 
meaning extends beyond words, there is no guarantee that words alone will 
restore an expressive equilibrium.  For example, the Scouts might be 
forced to adjust their policy statement about homosexuality in a way that is 
suboptimal to their associational purposes and beliefs.  It is also possible 
that the Scouts could believe that no words or statements would adequately 
disavow the symbolic meaning of Dale’s forced inclusion in their group.  
To illustrate further why the category of expressive association fails to 
encompass the broader understanding of meaning suggested in this Article, 
consider a gay social club.153  Suppose that the club has twenty members, 
placing it well outside of the currently recognized contours of an intimate 
association.  Suppose further that the club’s members engage in no verbal 
or written expression directed outside of their gatherings but make no 
effort to conceal their membership from their friends, colleagues, and 
acquaintances who are not part of the club.  There is no way that the 
members of this club are engaging in “a right to associate for the purpose 
of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, 
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of 
religion.”154  And yet there is clearly an expressive message in their very 
act of gathering.155  
2.  Meaning Is Dynamic 
The second problem with the reasoning underlying expressive 
association is that meaning is dynamic.  The messages, creeds, practices, 
                                                                                                                          
152 Id. at 603. 
153 See Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 2, at 11 (emphasizing that “many exclusively gay 
social and activity clubs, retreats, vacations, and professional organizations” have “relied on 
exclusively gay environments in which to feel safe, to build relationships, and to develop political 
strategy” (quoting Carpenter, supra note 2, at 1550)).   
154 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).  I assume here that Justice Brennan’s 
conception of assembly is a narrow and historically decontextualized one.  For an alternative vision of 
assembly, see infra Part VII. 
155 Provided, of course, that at least one person external to the group is aware of the gathering.  
The expressiveness inherent in an act of gathering presupposes an audience of some kind.  Thus, for 
example, the gathering of a secret society would not have an outward expressiveness.  Cf. Melville B. 
Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 36 
(1973) (“The right to engage in verbal locutions which no one can hear and in conduct which no one 
can observe may sometimes qualify as a due process ‘liberty,’ but without an actual or potential 
audience there can be no first amendment speech right.”).  While Nimmer’s observation may be 
formally correct, it makes little difference in the application of an expressive restriction.  Any act of 
self-expression (for example, expression undertaken without an actual or potential audience) becomes 
communicative when the state attempts to restrict it.  The very determination by a government actor 
that an act is not “communicative” or not “protected” is an interpretation of the meaning of the act that 
creates an audience in the government actor restricting the act. 
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and even the central purposes of associations change over time.  Justice 
Souter missed this reality when he argued in his Dale dissent that “no 
group can claim a right of expressive association without identifying a 
clear position to be advocated over time in an unequivocal way.”156  That 
standard proves too much.  What would it mean for a group to advocate a 
“clear position” “over time” in “an unequivocal way”?157   
3.  Meaning Is Subject to More Than One Interpretation 
The final problem with the idea of expressive association is that 
meaning is subject to more than one interpretive gloss.158  Acknowledging 
the subjective interpretation of meaning exposes a related problem inherent 
in the “message-based” approach of the expressive association doctrine: 
who decides what counts as the message of the group?  Chemerinsky and 
Fisk criticize the Supreme Court in Dale for unduly deferring to the Boy 
Scouts’ leadership’s views about the group’s expressive message.159  But 
there is not a readily apparent alternative that more “justly” or “accurately” 
captures the group’s expressive meaning.  For example, it is not obvious 
that a majority of the group’s members should be recognized as having the 
authoritative interpretation of the group’s meaning, particularly for 
                                                                                                                          
156 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 701 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).   
157 Even “[t]he ‘message’ conveyed by a monument may change over time.”  Pleasant Grove City 
v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1136 (2009).  The character of an organization or association may 
likewise change over time:  
[T]he line between commercial associations and political organizations is not easily 
drawn, nor can one predict when a commercial association will metamorphose into 
an important expressive association.  For example, America’s most powerful 
lobbying organization, the American Association of Retired Persons, began as a 
commercial association organized to sell health care products to the elderly, and still 
has substantial business interests.  
David E. Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus Civil Liberties, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 133, 183 
[hereinafter Bernstein, Sex Discrimination]. 
158 Cf. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS, supra note 5, at 6 (“There are always alternative 
understandings of an association’s nature and purpose, and competing classifications.”).  Justice Alito 
recently made a similar observation about monuments: 
Even when a monument features the written word, the monument may be intended 
to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety 
of ways. . . .   
. . . [T]ext-based monuments are almost certain to evoke different thoughts and 
sentiments in the minds of different observers, and the effect of monuments that do 
not contain text is likely to be even more variable.   
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135.   
At least three of the other Dale justices appear to share Souter’s view. Justices Ginsburg and 
Breyer joined Souter’s dissent.  530 U.S. at 702.  Justice Stevens made a similar claim in his dissent.  
Id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Equally important is BSA’s failure to adopt any clear position on 
homosexuality.  BSA’s temporary, though ultimately abandoned, view that homosexuality is 
incompatible with being ‘morally straight’ and ‘clean’ is a far cry from the clear, unequivocal statement 
necessary to prevail on its claim.”). 
159 See Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 149, at 600 (arguing that the Court’s holdings in Dale 
“will allow any group that wants to discriminate to do so by claiming . . . a desire to exclude based on 
any characteristics that it chooses”). 
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hierarchically structured groups.160 And as Andrew Koppelman has 
suggested, “it is unseemly, and potentially abusive, for courts to tell 
organizations—particularly organizations with dissenting political views—
what their positions are.”161 
The challenges to determining a group’s meaning get even thornier.  
Consider three different characterizations that Chemerinsky and Fisk offer 
about the purposes of the Boy Scouts: (1) a “significant number of current 
and former scouts . . . reasonably believed that scouting was, and should 
be, about camping”;162 (2) all members of the Boy Scouts understand that 
“the Boy Scouts is for boys,” and “[a]ll presumably believe that same sex 
experiences offer valuable developmental opportunities for children”;163 
and (3) “we suspect [that] Boy Scouts of America is understood [by its 
members] to be about honesty, self-reliance, service, leadership, and 
camping.”164  These descriptions are not interchangeable.  They assign 
different purposes to the Boy Scouts (camping vs. gender-based activities 
vs. camping plus other things), they attribute those purposes to different 
subsets of the association (a significant number of current and former 
scouts vs. all members vs. members), and they attach varying degrees of 
certainty to the asserted meaning (the belief was “reasonable” vs. all 
members “presumably believed” vs. the belief is something that 
Chemerinsky and Fisk “suspect”).  All of these variations and their varying 
rhetorical emphases spring from the description of a single association in a 
single law review article.  It is not hard to see how the interpretive 
dilemmas multiply when assertions of purpose and meaning are expanded 
ever further.  These interminable inquiries into what counts as the 
expressive message of a group are artificially imposed by the artificial 
distinction between expressive and nonexpressive associations.   
4.  The Limits of Expression 
Once we acknowledge the multivalent expression inherent in group 
activity, we can no longer easily label some groups as “nonexpressive.”  It 
might be argued that this claim runs afoul of basic First Amendment 
doctrine.  For example, in United States v. O’Brien, the seminal case on 
symbolic speech, the Court rejected “the view that an apparently limitless 
variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging 
                                                                                                                          
160 For examples of groups whose meaning and message are not determined by majority vote, see 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States . . . .”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 613 (1984) (“The ultimate policymaking 
authority of the Jaycees rests with an annual national convention, consisting of delegates from each 
local chapter, with a national president and board of directors,” instead of by a majority vote of the 
entire membership). 
161 KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at 24. 
162 Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 149, at 608. 
163 Id. at 609. 
164 Id. at 611. 
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in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”165  But the Court has 
itself undermined this distinction with its expansive embrace of the concept 
of symbolic speech, and interpreting O’Brien’s parsing of speech and 
conduct too mechanically is “doomed to failure.”166  All that the purported 
definitional limitation on “speech” means is that some conduct can be 
regulated based upon its content or harm irrespective of whether it has an 
expressive component.167  Thus, the Court acknowledges the expressive 
dimensions of dancing naked168 and sleeping in a park169 even as it 
endorses the government’s proscription of those activities.   Of course, as 
these examples illustrate, not every expressive act warrants constitutional 
protection: defining what constitutes expression differs from determining 
the scope of legal protection.  Recognizing the expressive potential of 
associations tells us nothing about whether they will be constitutionally 
protected.  But it prevents those who exercise coercive power over our 
lives from avoiding a meaningful weighing of constitutional values simply 
by classifying some groups as “nonexpressive.”170  
V.  THE COST TO THE JAYCEES 
The preceding two sections have traced the developments leading to 
the Court’s recognition of the categories of intimate and expressive 
association in Roberts and identified the problems with these categories.  
This section explores how the Court’s use of intimate and expressive 
association in Roberts illegitimately rejected the associational claims of the 
                                                                                                                          
165 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
166 See Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 110 (1989) (“[The] attempt to distinguish 
between speech and conduct is doomed to failure.”). 
167 Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (“We have sometimes said that 
[certain] categories of expression are ‘not within the area of constitutionally protected speech,’ or that 
the ‘protection of the First Amendment does not extend’ to them.  Such statements must be taken in 
context, however, and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand 
characterizing obscenity ‘as not being speech at all.’  What they mean is that these areas of speech can, 
consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable 
content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the 
Constitution . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).  
168 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (“[N]ude dancing of the kind 
sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, 
though we view it as only marginally so.”).   
169 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) (assuming that 
“overnight sleeping” in a park, as an act of protest, might be expression covered by the First 
Amendment but upholding a ban on overnight sleeping as a content-neutral restriction). 
170 The Supreme Court occasionally evades this distinction.  See Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (claiming that “we have extended First 
Amendment protection only to conduct that is inherently expressive”).  Commenting upon this sentence 
in FAIR, Dale Carpenter rightly notes that the Court “cites no precedent for this conclusion or for the 
phrase ‘inherently expressive.’  No prior majority opinion on the subject has suggested that in deciding 
whether conduct is expressive we should look only at the conduct itself, rather than at both the conduct 
and the context in which it occurs.”  Dale Carpenter, Unanimously Wrong, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
217, 243. 
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Jaycees.  It first considers Justice Brennan’s unconvincing focus on the 
size, seclusion, and selectivity of the Jaycees in his attempt to cast the 
group as nonintimate.  It then turns to the ways in which both Brennan and 
Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence, characterized the purpose and 
activities of the Jaycees in denying the group protection as an expressive 
association. 
A.  Size, Seclusion, Selectivity, and the Specter of Segregation 
After distinguishing between intimate and nonintimate associations, 
Justice Brennan attempted to determine where an association’s “objective 
characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most 
attenuated of personal attachments.”171  He defined an intimate association 
as “distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of 
selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion 
from others in critical aspects of the relationship.”172  He noted that factors 
relevant to determining intimacy include “size, purpose, policies, 
selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case 
may be pertinent.”173  The size of an association is critical to Brennan’s 
argument.  He had reported in the first part of his opinion that the Jaycees 
was a 295,000-member organization.174  In considering whether the group 
was an intimate association, he observed that even “the local chapters of 
the Jaycees are large and basically unselective groups.”175  The 
Minneapolis chapter, for example, had “approximately 430 members.”176  
These figures are meant to persuade the reader that the Jaycees clearly falls 
outside of the bounds of an intimate association.  But Brennan’s numbers 
also deflect attention away from the actual relationships that undoubtedly 
formed in local chapters of the large national organization.  It is hard to 
imagine the Minneapolis Jaycees coming together in meetings, social 
events, charitable activities, and planning sessions without meaningful 
interaction between members, including some that led to close friendships 
                                                                                                                          
171 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984). 
172 Id. at 620.  Brennan continued: “As a general matter, only relationships with these sorts of 
qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding of freedom of 
association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty.”  Id. 
173 Id.  Brennan’s appeal to “other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent” has 
not offered a very clear judicial test for defining the contours of intimate association.   As Justice 
Stevens noted in his Dale dissent, “the precise scope of the right to intimate association is unclear.”  
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 698 n.26 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Udell, 
supra note 83, at 239–40 (describing the “chaos” of lower court attempts to construe intimate 
association and noting “myriad tests, even within the same circuit”).  But see supra note 84 and 
accompanying text (suggesting that courts have found most associations to be nonintimate).   
174 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613 (“At the time of trial in August 1981, the Jaycees had 
approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters affiliated with [fifty-one] state 
organizations.”).   
175 Id. at 621. 
176 Id. 
 2010]             UNSETTLING “WELL-SETTLED” LAW OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION             183 
and personal bonds.  
Brennan’s focus on lack of seclusion as an indicator of intimacy is also 
problematic.  He critiqued the Jaycees because women and nonmembers—
“strangers,” actually—were present at the group’s events: 
[W]omen affiliated with the Jaycees attend various meetings, 
participate in selected projects, and engage in many of the 
organization’s social functions. Indeed, numerous 
nonmembers of both genders regularly participate in a 
substantial portion of activities central to the decision of 
many members to associate with one another, including many 
of the organization’s various community programs, awards 
ceremonies, and recruitment meetings.  In short, the local 
chapters of the Jaycees are neither small nor selective.  
Moreover, much of the activity central to the formation and 
maintenance of the association involves the participation of 
strangers to that relationship.177  
These assertions raise a number of questions.  How does Brennan 
know which activities were “central to the decision of many members to 
associate with one another”?  Similarly, on what basis can he purport to 
know “the activity central to the formation and maintenance of the 
association”?178  Even if he were capable of making these determinations, 
what is the significance of the fact that “strangers” participated in “various 
community programs, awards ceremonies, and recruitment meetings”?179  
Isn’t this the case with many associations that rent conference space, enlist 
professional fundraisers, or cater their events?180  
Brennan’s least convincing argument in his attempt to characterize the 
Jaycees as nonintimate was his focus on the group’s lack of selectivity.  He 
distinguished the Kiwanis Club from the Jaycees because the Kiwanis had 
“a formal procedure for choosing members on the basis of specific and 
selective criteria” while the Jaycees looked only at gender and age.181  That 
distinction seems strained, and it also calls into question the relationship 
between selectivity and intimacy.  Book clubs, gardening clubs, and some 
recreational sports leagues are often less selective than the Jaycees in their 
                                                                                                                          
177 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
178 Id.   
179 Id.  
180 Cf. id. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“No association is likely ever to be exclusively 
engaged in expressive activities, if only because it will collect dues from its members or purchase 
printing materials or rent lecture halls or serve coffee and cakes at its meetings.”).  One might also 
wonder exactly which “local chapters of the Jaycees” Brennan is describing, given that the Minneapolis 
and St. Paul Jaycees already admitted women as full members.  Id. at 627 (majority opinion). 
181 Id. at 621, 630.  In fact, the Jaycees looked at more than gender and age.  See U.S. Jaycees v. 
McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1571–72 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that the St. Paul bylaws required that 
applicants be of “good character and reputation”). 
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membership requirements, but they can foster intimate connections among 
their members.   
Brennan’s focus on selectivity did, however, establish a link between 
the Jaycees and segregationist groups.182  To support his contention that 
“the local chapters of the Jaycees are large and basically unselective 
groups,”183 Brennan cited three cases: Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven 
Recreation Ass’n,184 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,185 and Daniel v. 
Paul.186  But the problem with Tillman, Sullivan, and Daniel wasn’t that 
they employed a single membership criterion.  It was that the criterion was: 
(1) race; (2) used by whites to exclude blacks; (3) in membership groups 
closely tied to housing (Tillman and Sullivan) or created as an obvious 
sham (Daniel); (4) in the midst of the Civil Rights Era.  The constitutional 
rationale underlying these cases wasn’t that unselective groups lacked an 
intimacy worthy of constitutional protection but that: (1) their lack of 
selectivity factored against qualifying under the public club exception to 
the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and 
(2) “the exclusion of Negroes from white communities” reflected “the 
badges and incidents of slavery.”187 
Toward the end of his Roberts’s opinion, Brennan revisited the 
connection between the Jaycees and segregationist groups: 
[E]ven if enforcement of the [Minnesota] Act causes some 
incidental abridgment of the Jaycees’ protected speech, that 
effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the 
State’s legitimate purposes.  As we have explained, acts of 
invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly 
available goods, services, and other advantages cause 
unique evils that government has a compelling interest to 
prevent—wholly apart from the point of view such conduct 
may transmit.  Accordingly, like violence or other types of 
potentially expressive activities that produce special harms 
distinct from their communicative impact, such practices are 
entitled to no constitutional protection.  In prohibiting such 
practices, the Minnesota Act therefore “responds precisely to 
the substantive problem which legitimately concerns” the 
                                                                                                                          
182 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621 (citing Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 410 U.S. 431, 
438 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 
298, 302 (1969)).  Andrew Koppelman and Tobias Wolff’s recent book employs a similar approach.  
See KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at 6 (“The libertarian right to exclude, then, is racist at the 
core.”). 
183 468 U.S. at 621. 
184 410 U.S. 431 (1973). 
185 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
186 395 U.S. 298 (1969). 
187 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441–42 (1968). 
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State and abridges no more speech or associational freedom 
than is necessary to accomplish that purpose.188 
Notice the italicized language.  It adds little to Brennan’s analysis of 
whether Minnesota’s Act was narrowly tailored and minimally intrusive 
(the doctrinal focus of the paragraph).  In fact, it contradicts that analysis, 
asserting that the Jaycees’s desire to limit the participation of women was 
“entitled to no constitutional protection.”189  If the right of expressive 
association was “plainly implicated in this case,”190 then it clearly enjoyed 
some constitutional protection. Brennan’s citation to Runyon is also 
problematic.  His pincite tags Stewart’s distinction between belief and 
practice, which rested on the view that “even some private discrimination 
is subject to special remedial legislation in certain circumstances under § 2 
of the Thirteenth Amendment.”191 Stewart relied on the Thirteenth 
Amendment in this passage not as a source of congressional power but for 
the direct authority to interfere with some forms of private discrimination.  
That raises the question of whether the principle announced in Runyon 
trumps a right of association claim in cases involving discrimination not 
based on race.192  Brennan never explained how remedying the “unique 
evils” in Runyon (rooted in the “badges and incidents of slavery”) provided 
a legal justification for destroying the Jaycees for their gender-based 
discrimination.  
Whether he intended it or not, the real force of Brennan’s references to 
Runyon and “invidious discrimination” was the visceral emotion that they 
stirred, equating the Jaycees’s position to the racism of segregation.193  The 
Jaycees had warned of this danger in its brief to the Court: 
Sprinkled throughout the opposing briefs are references 
to “invidious discrimination” as applied to the Jaycees’ all-
male policy.  The term is used in such cases as Runyon v. 
McCrary and Gilmore v. City of Montgomery against a 
backdrop of racial discrimination.  The use of this term is 
                                                                                                                          
188 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628–29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting City Council of 
L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810 (1984)).  Both Roberts and the Civil Rights cases 
Brennan cited stretched the meaning of “public accommodation” to bring private activity within the 
reach of the relevant statutes.  
189 Id. at 628. 
190 Id. at 622. 
191 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 175–76 (1976). 
192 Cf. William Buss, Discrimination by Private Clubs, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 815, 826 (1989) (“The 
thirteenth amendment, then, seems a fully adequate power to prevent race discrimination and race-like 
discrimination, but it is not a likely candidate as a source of federal legislative power for preventing 
private club discrimination on the basis of sex.”).   
193 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628; cf. Bernstein, Expressive Association, supra note 24, at 200–01 
(“Brennan characterized the Jaycees’ discriminatory practices as akin to violence and not worthy of 
constitutional protection, and therefore gave the right of expressive association short shrift in his 
compelling interest analysis.”). 
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apparently intended to suggest that the Jaycees’ all-male 
membership policy is somehow immoral and unsavory and 
therefore not entitled to protection against the State’s police 
powers.194   
Yet rather than heed this warning, Brennan embraced the comparison, 
writing that the “stigmatizing injury [of discrimination], and the denial of 
equal opportunities that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by 
persons suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those 
treated differently because of their race.”195  In one sense, the claim is 
correct—the kind of exclusion in which the Jaycees engaged is 
undoubtedly hurtful and stigmatizing to some people.  But we ought to 
pause before accepting Brennan’s specific application of the general 
principle.  It is not clear that the circumstances facing women in 
Minneapolis in 1984 were on the same order of those facing African 
Americans in Montgomery in 1974, or that the judicial remedies in these 
situations would have accomplished objectives of similar magnitude, and 
these differences may well have mattered had Brennan engaged in a 
meaningful weighing of constitutional values.  
B.  Monolithic Meaning 
The Court’s treatment of the Jaycees in Roberts also illustrates the thin 
protections of expressive association when expression is narrowly 
construed.  Justice Brennan contended that the Jaycees “failed to 
demonstrate that the Act impose[d] any serious burdens on the male 
members’ freedom of expressive association.”196  He dismissed as “sexual 
stereotyping” the Jaycees’ argument that allowing women to vote “will 
change the content or impact of the organization’s speech.”197  Judge 
                                                                                                                          
194 Brief of Appellee at *23, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 237 [hereinafter Brief of Appellee] (internal citations omitted). 
195 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625.  
196 Id. (emphasis added).  The assertion is indefensible.  See SOIFER, supra note 24, at 40 (“Surely 
the Jaycees . . . will be a different organization [after admitting women with voting rights].  Surely that 
difference will be felt throughout an intricate web of relationships and different voices in immeasurable 
but nonetheless significant ways.”); Richard W. Garnett, Jaycees Reconsidered: Judge Richard S. 
Arnold and the Freedom of Association, 58 ARK. L. REV. 587, 597 n.53 (2005) (“[I]f the application of 
the Human Rights Act really imposed no ‘serious burdens’ on the freedom of expressive association, it 
is not clear why the Act’s application should require justification under the Court’s strict-scrutiny 
methodology.”); Kateb, supra note 24, at 55 (“Brennan’s claim that young women may, after their 
compulsory admission, contribute to the allowable purpose of ‘promoting the interests of young men’ 
is absurd.”); Rosenblum, Compelled Association, supra note 87, at 78 (“The Jaycees’ ‘voice’ was 
undeniably altered once it was forced to admit young women as full members along with young 
men.”).  But see Sunder, supra note 24, at 539 (“In Roberts and the cases immediately following it, the 
balance between liberty and equality swung in favor of equality interests because the associations at 
issue offered no evidence of any expressive message that would be threatened by inclusion of the 
plaintiffs.”). 
197 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.  Richard Garnett suggests that some of Brennan’s “assertions sound 
dated today, like the kind of things one might have expected from an elderly, well-meaning, liberal 
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Richard Arnold’s reasoning in the court below provides a useful contrast: 
If the statute is upheld, the basic purpose of the Jaycees will 
change.  It will become an association for the advancement of 
young people. . . .  
. . . .  
[S]ome change in the Jaycees’ philosophical cast can 
reasonably be expected.  It is not hard to imagine, for 
example, that if women become full-fledged members in any 
substantial numbers, it will not be long before efforts are 
made to change the Jaycee Creed.  Young women may take a 
dim view of affirming the “brotherhood of man,” or declaring 
how “free men” can best win economic justice.  Such phrases 
are not trivial.  The use of language betrays an attitude of 
mind, even if unconsciously, and that attitude is part of the 
belief and expression that the First Amendment protects.198 
Judge Arnold’s attention to the Jaycees’s expressivism is missing not 
only from Brennan’s opinion but also from Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence.199  O’Connor concluded that the Jaycees’s attention to and 
success in membership drives meant that it was “first and foremost, an 
organization that, at both the national and local levels, promote[d] and 
practice[d] the art of solicitation and management.”200  Other language in 
her concurrence suggested that: 
[A]n association should be characterized as commercial, and 
therefore subject to rationally related state regulation of its 
membership and other associational activities, when, and 
only when, the association’s activities are not predominantly 
of the type protected by the First Amendment.  It is only 
when the association is predominantly engaged in protected 
expression that state regulation of its membership will 
necessarily affect, change, dilute, or silence one collective 
                                                                                                                          
male jurist eager to say ‘the right thing’ about sex discrimination and stereotypes in the mid-1980s.”  
Garnett, supra note 196, at 600. 
198 U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1571 (8th Cir. 1983).  Garnett offers a more detailed 
contrast between Judge Arnold’s reasoning and the Brennan and O’Connor opinions.  See generally 
Garnett, supra note 196. 
199 O’Connor’s concurrence is sometimes viewed more favorably than Brennan’s majority 
opinion.  See, e.g., Douglas O. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 82 MICH. 
L. REV. 1878, 1896 (1984) (“On balance, the O’Connor approach seems to enjoy several distinct 
advantages over the majority approach.”); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with 
Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 876 (2005) (“Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Jaycees was largely correct.”). 
200 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 639 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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voice that would otherwise be heard.201 
O’Connor’s reasoning is problematic on three counts.  First, she posits 
a false dichotomy between commercial and expressive associations—
associations can be both commercial and expressive.202  Second, her 
requirement that an association be “predominantly engaged”203 in protected 
expression to avoid being classified as commercial hurts associations that, 
because of their size or unpopularity, must devote a substantial portion of 
their activities to fundraising or other commercial activities.204  Finally, she 
leaves unclear which activities are “of the type protected by the First 
Amendment.”205  
Judge Arnold’s opinion offers a very different perspective to 
O’Connor’s assertion that the Jaycees was “first and foremost” a 
commercial association: 
Some of what local chapters do is purely social.  They 
have parties, with no purpose more complicated than 
enjoying themselves.  Some of it is civic.  They have 
conducted a radio fund-raising drive to combat multiple 
sclerosis.  They have conducted a women’s professional golf 
tournament.  They have engaged in many other charitable and 
educational projects for the public good.  (And there is no 
claim, incidentally, of any discrimination in the offering to 
the public of the benefits of these projects.  Money raised to 
fight disease, for example, is not used to benefit only male 
patients.)  And they have advocated, through the years, a 
multitude of political and social causes.  Governmental 
affairs is one of the chief areas of the organization’s activity.  
Members on a national, state, and local basis are frequently 
meeting, debating issues of public policy, taking more or less 
controversial stands, and making opinions known to local, 
state, and national officials.206 
Arnold further elaborated: 
                                                                                                                          
201 Id. at 635–36. 
202 As Larry Alexander notes, “[l]aws regulating membership in any organization—including 
commercial ones—will affect the content of that organization’s expression.”  Larry Alexander, What Is 
Freedom of Association and What Is Its Denial?, 25 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2008).   
203 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
204 One of the clearest illustrations of this consequence is the disparate effect of some charitable 
solicitation regulation on small or unpopular charities.  See John D. Inazu, Making Sense of 
Schaumburg: Seeking Coherence in First Amendment Charitable Solicitation Law, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 
551, 581–83 (2009) (explaining that, in the area of charitable solicitation, the more burdensome 
content-neutral regulations tend to threaten less established charities, and thus endanger their First 
Amendment rights). 
205 Roberts, 468 U.S. at  635 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
206 U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1569 (8th Cir. 1983). 
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The Jaycees does not simply sell seats in some kind of 
personal-development classroom.  Personal and business 
development, if they come, come not as products bought by 
members, but as by-products of activities in which members 
engage after they join the organization.  These activities are 
variously social, civic, and ideological, and some of them fall 
within the narrowest view of First Amendment freedom of 
association.207   
His view is consistent with the Jaycees’ own assertions that they were: 
[O]rganized for such educational and charitable purposes as 
will promote and foster the growth and development of 
young men’s civic organizations in the United States, 
designed to inculcate in the individual membership of such 
organization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic 
interest, and as a supplementary education institution to 
provide them with opportunity for personal development and 
achievement and an avenue for intelligent participation by 
young men in the affairs of their community, state and 
nation, and to develop true friendship and understanding 
among young men of all nations.208  
Parsing which of these activities constitute the group’s “predominate” 
activities is a difficult interpretive task, one that neither Brennan nor 
O’Connor undertook.209   
VI.  WHY DOCTRINE MATTERS 
The harm of the doctrinal framework in Roberts did not end with the 
Jaycees.  The categories of intimate and expressive association continue to 
shape legal decisions that profoundly affect people’s lives.  This section 
recounts two more recent examples of groups that have suffered under the 
Roberts framework.210  The first is the Chi Iota Colony of the Alpha 
                                                                                                                          
207 Id.   
208 Brief of Appellee, supra note 194, at *5.   
209 Brennan’s opinion did note that the Jaycees engaged in “protected expression on political, 
economic, cultural, and social affairs” and recognized that “the Jaycees regularly engage in a variety of 
civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under 
the First Amendment.”  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626–27.  But in the very next sentence, he wrote that there 
was “no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will 
impede the organization’s ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred 
views.”  Id. at 627.   
210 Of course, the case law on freedom of association has changed since Roberts.  Some post-
Roberts cases have affected the doctrinal development of freedom of association in important ways, 
most notably Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).  See also Rumsfeld v. Forum 
for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 68–70 (2006) (refusing to expand the scope of Dale); 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995) 
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Epsilon Pi fraternity at the College of Staten Island (a nonintimate 
nonexpressive association).  The second is the student chapter of the 
Christian Legal Society at Hastings Law School (a nonintimate expressive 
association).   
A.  The Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi 
Alpha Epsilon Pi (“AEPi”) is a national social fraternity founded in 
1913 “to provide opportunities for the Jewish college man seeking the best 
possible college and fraternity experience.”211  According to its Supreme 
Constitution, AEPi seeks “to promote and encourage among its members: 
Personal perfection, a reverence for God and an honorable life devoted to 
the ideal of service to all mankind; lasting friendships and the attainment of 
nobility of action and better understanding among all faiths . . . .”212   
In 2002, the Chi Iota Colony (“Chi Iota”) of AEPi formed at the 
College of Staten Island.213  Between 2002 and 2005, Chi Iota never had 
more than twenty members.214  Its past president described the purpose of 
the fraternity as fostering a “lifelong interpersonal bond termed 
brotherhood,” which “results in deep attachments and commitments to the 
other members of the Fraternity among whom is shared a community of 
thoughts, experiences, beliefs and distinctly personal aspects of their 
lives.”215  In furtherance of those goals, the fraternity limited its 
membership to males.216 
Chi Iota applied to be chartered and officially recognized by the 
College of Staten Island in March 2004.217 The Director of the Office of 
                                                                                                                          
(rejecting, on free speech rather than free association principles, the challenge of a gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual group of its exclusion from a city parade); City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 20–21 (1989) 
(denying the expressive association claim of the owner of a for-profit skating rink who challenged an 
ordinance restricting admission to certain ages); N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 
1, 7–8 (1988) (upholding anti-discrimination laws applied to a consortium of New York City social 
clubs); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (upholding anti-
discrimination laws applied to the Rotary Club).  But the basic premise of this article is that the 
categories of intimate and expressive association that began in Roberts remain essentially intact, and it 
is in these categories that the most significant doctrinal and theoretical problems surrounding the right 
of association remain.  Neither Dale nor any of the other post-Roberts cases alters this premise.  Cf. 
Andrew Koppelman, Should Noncommercial Associations Have an Absolute Right To Discriminate?, 
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 57 (2004) (“Dale is a mess, but the upshot of the mess is that we still 
have the old message-based rule of Roberts.”); Shiffrin, supra note 199, at 841 (“The Court’s framing 
of the issues [in Dale] grew straight out of Justice Brennan’s opinion in Roberts v. Jaycees.”).   
211 Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d 374, 
376 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Alpha Epsilon Pi’s mission statement).    
212 Id. at 377 (quoting Alpha Epsilon Pi’s bylaws). 
213 Id. at 376.  The College of Staten Island is a primarily commuter campus of just over 11,000 
undergraduates. 
214 See id. (noting that, at the time of the case in 2005, the fraternity had eighteen members, and 
the plaintiffs estimated that membership was unlikely to exceed fifty persons).  
215 Id. at 377 (quotation marks omitted). 
216 See id. at 379 (explaining the selection and initiation process for prospective members). 
217 Id. at 380. 
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Student Life denied the application on the basis that the fraternity’s 
exclusion of women violated the college’s nondiscrimination policy.218  
The denial of official recognition precluded Chi Iota from using the 
college’s facilities, resources, and funding, as well as from using the 
college’s name in conjunction with the group’s name, and from posting 
events to the college’s calendars.219   
In 2005, the members of Chi Iota filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York, arguing violations of their 
rights to intimate and expressive association and to equal protection.220  
The district court granted the fraternity’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction against the college on its intimate association claim but 
concluded that Chi Iota had not shown a clear or substantial likelihood of 
success on its expressive association claim.221  On appeal, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s grant 
of a preliminary injunction and remanded the case, noting that the 
fraternity’s “interests in intimate association are relatively weak.”222  
Although the district court would still have had Chi Iota’s intimate and 
expressive association claims before it on remand, neither looked to have a 
reasonable chance of success given the posture of the litigation.  As the 
Second Circuit was considering the case, the Chi Iota Colony of the Alpha 
Epsilon Pi Fraternity at the College of Staten Island disbanded.223   
Chi Iota is not the most sympathetic plaintiff to bring a freedom of 
association claim.  Although its Jewish roots suggested religious freedom 
interests, most of its members were nonpracticing Jews.224  It was a social 
group, but some of its social activities were coarse and banal, including 
visits to strip clubs.225  It may well be that the brothers of Chi Iota were a 
self-focused, hedonistic group of boys who brought a collective drain on 
whatever community existed at the mostly commuter campus at the 
College of Staten Island.226  
                                                                                                                          
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 380; cf. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972) (“There can be no doubt that denial of 
official recognition, without justification, to college organizations burdens or abridges [the right of 
individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs].”).   
220 Chi Iota, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 381. 
221 Id. at 389, 395. 
222 Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 149 (2d 
Cir. 2007). 
223 E-mail from Gregory F. Hauser, to author (Sept. 30, 2009) (on file with author and 
Connecticut Law Review).  Mr. Hauser represented Chi Iota in the litigation.  
224 See Chi Iota, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 378 (quoting Chi Iota’s president, explaining that the 
fraternity members were “not extremely religious, but [did] talk about [their contributions] to the 
community, an expression of Judaism”).   
225 Chi Iota, 502 F.3d at 141. 
226 Of course, the brothers of Chi Iota may also have had many endearing characteristics, 
especially to one another.  As David Bernstein notes:   
[M]any believe that college fraternity and sorority members experience a “special 
camaraderie” that would not exist if members of the opposite sex were included.  
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But all of this is beside the point.  Associational protections should not 
turn on whether a group’s purposes or activities are sincere or wholesome 
to an outsider’s perspective.  The group’s practices and activities meant 
something to the brothers of Chi Iota.  They meant enough for the brothers 
to pursue membership through an application and rush process, to 
participate in the group’s activities, and to bring a federal lawsuit in an 
attempt to preserve their associational bonds.  
B.  The Christian Legal Society at Hastings Law School 
The Christian Legal Society (“CLS”) is a “nationwide association of 
lawyers, law students, law professors, and judges who profess faith in 
Jesus Christ.”227  Founded in 1961, its purposes include “providing a 
means of society, fellowship, and nurture among Christian lawyers; 
encouraging, discipling, and aiding Christian law students; promoting 
justice, religious liberty, and biblical conflict resolution; and encouraging 
lawyers to furnish legal services to the poor.”228  CLS maintains student 
chapters at many law schools around the country.229  These student 
chapters invite anyone to participate in their events but require members—
including officers—to sign a Statement of Faith consistent with the 
Protestant evangelical and Catholic traditions.230  Part of this Statement of 
Faith affirms that sexual conduct should be confined to heterosexual 
marriage.  Accordingly, CLS student chapters do not accept as members 
anyone who engaged in or affirmed the morality of sex outside of 
heterosexual marriage.231 
In 2004, the CLS chapter at Hastings Law School in San Francisco 
inquired about becoming a recognized student organization.232  Hastings 
officials withheld recognition because CLS’s Statement of Faith violated 
the religion and sexual orientation provisions of the school’s 
                                                                                                                          
For young people especially, the presence of the opposite sex in a social setting is 
likely to create sexual tension and concern for one’s appearance, making it harder 
for them to relax and to get away from the pressure and stress of everyday life.  
Bernstein, Sex Discrimination, supra note 157, at 186–87.   
227 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Newton, 
No. 08-1371 (S. Ct. May 5, 2009).   
228 Id.  
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 7 (citation omitted). 
231 See id. at 8 (“In view of the clear dictates of Scripture, unrepentant participation in or 
advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle is inconsistent with an affirmation of the Statement of Faith, 
and consequently may be regarded by CLS as disqualifying such an individual from CLS membership.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  CLS specifies that “[a] person’s mere experience of same-sex or 
opposite-sex sexual attraction does not determine his or her eligibility for leadership or voting 
membership,” but “CLS individually addresses each situation that arises in a sensitive Biblical 
fashion.”  Id. 
232 Id. 
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Nondiscrimination Policy.233  As a result, the school denied CLS travel 
funds and funding from student activity fees.234  It also denied them the use 
of the school’s logo, use of a Hastings e-mail address, the opportunity to 
send mass e-mails to the student body, participation in the annual student 
organizations fair, and reserved meeting spaces on campus.235  Hastings 
subsequently asserted that its denial of recognition stemmed from an 
“accept-all-comers” policy that required any student organization to accept 
any student who desired to be a member of the organization.236 
CLS filed suit in federal district court asserting violations of expressive 
association, free speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection.237  
In Christian Legal Society v. Kane, the court granted summary judgment 
against CLS on all of its claims.238  With respect to CLS’s expressive 
association claim, the court concluded that Roberts and Dale were 
inapplicable because “CLS is not being forced, as a private entity, to 
include certain members or officers” and “the conditioned exclusion of 
[an] organization from a particular forum [does] not rise to the level of 
compulsive membership.”239  The court also asserted that “Hastings has 
denied CLS official recognition based on CLS’s conduct—its refusal to 
comply with Hastings’s Nondiscrimination Policy—not because of CLS’s 
philosophies or beliefs.”240 
Despite resting its holding on the inapplicability of Roberts and Dale, 
the court held in the alternative that CLS’s claim failed under those 
                                                                                                                          
233 Id. at 9. 
234 Id. at 10. 
235 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 WL 
997217, at *17 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 227, at 10.  
Hastings did not deny CLS the “use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate purposes,” 
which the Supreme Court has called “[t]he primary impediment to free association flowing from 
nonrecognition.”  Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972).  Still, nothing in Healy suggests that the 
lack of access to campus facilities for meetings is the only burden caused by nonrecognition, and it is 
not hard to see how the inability to reserve meeting spaces, to access e-mail lists, or to participate in 
student fairs could burden associational freedoms:   
Petitioners’ associational interests also were circumscribed by the denial of the 
use of campus bulletin boards and the school newspaper.  If an organization is to 
remain a viable entity in a campus community in which new students enter on a 
regular basis, it must possess the means of communicating with these students.  
Moreover, the organization’s ability to participate in the intellectual give and take of 
campus debate, and to pursue its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the 
customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and 
other students.  Such impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial. 
Id. at 181–82 (footnote omitted). 
236 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010). 
237 Kane, 2006 WL 997217, at *4. 
238 The district court granted leave for a group called Hastings Outlaw to intervene in the case.  
Outlaw asserted that its members had a right to be officers and voting members in any other campus 
group (including CLS) and that its members opposed their student activity fees funding an organization 
that they found offensive.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 227, at 10–11. 
239 Kane, 2006 WL 997217, at *15 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 91 (2d Cir. 
2003)). 
240 Id. at *17. 
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authorities as well.  It assumed that CLS qualified as an expressive 
association because Hastings did not dispute that characterization.241  But 
the court determined that “CLS has not demonstrated that its ability to 
express its views would be significantly impaired by complying with [the 
school’s nondiscrimination] requirement.”242  The court concluded: 
[U]nlike the Boy Scouts in Dale, CLS has not submitted any 
evidence demonstrating that teaching certain values to other 
students is part of the organization’s mission or purpose, or 
that it seeks to do so by example, such that the mere presence 
of someone who does not fully comply with the prescribed 
code of conduct would force CLS to send a message contrary 
to its mission.243 
In fact, the court found “no evidence” that “a non-orthodox Christian, gay, 
lesbian, or bisexual student” who became a member or officer of CLS, “by 
[his or her] presence alone, would impair CLS’s ability to convey its 
beliefs.”244 That conclusion repeats the fallacy in Runyon that forcing 
integration on a racist group wouldn’t alter its message and the fallacy in 
Roberts that forcing an all-male group to accept women wouldn’t alter its 
message. 
CLS appealed the district court’s decision to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The appellate court affirmed the district 
court with a terse two-sentence opinion: “The parties stipulate that 
Hastings imposes an open membership rule on all student groups—all 
groups must accept all comers as voting members even if those individuals 
disagree with the mission of the group.  The conditions on recognition are 
therefore viewpoint neutral and reasonable.”245  CLS petitioned for a writ 
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, arguing, among other 
things, that the Ninth Circuit’s Kane decision (subsequently restyled as 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez) created a circuit split with a Seventh 
Circuit case invalidating the denial of official recognition to a CLS student 
chapter at the Southern Illinois University School of Law.246   
A divided Supreme Court rejected CLS’s challenge.247  Justice 
                                                                                                                          
241 Id. at *20; cf. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2006) (“It would be 
hard to argue—and no one does—that CLS is not an expressive association.”). 
242 Kane, 2006 WL 997217, at *20. 
243 Id. at *22. 
244 Id. at *23. 
245 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 F. App’x 645 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, Christian 
Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 795 (2009), aff’d and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).  The court 
cited its opinion in Truth v. Kent School District, 542 F.3d 634, 649–50 (9th Cir. 2008), in which it 
ruled that a school district could deny recognition to a high school Bible club that limited its voting 
members and officers to those who shared the group’s beliefs. 
246 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 859–60 (7th Cir. 2006). 
247 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).  
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Ginsburg’s majority opinion concluded that Hastings’ all-comers policy 
was “a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student-
organization forum.”248  Justice Alito authored a dissent joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Scalia.249   
The majority’s free speech analysis is not entirely persuasive—its 
reasoning obscures a tension between the viewpoint neutrality of the all-
comers policy (under a public forum analysis) and Hastings’ non-neutral 
policy preferences expressed through its own speech and subsidies (under 
something akin to a government speech analysis).250  But in the context of 
this Article, an even more disturbing aspect of the opinion is the majority’s 
failure to take seriously CLS’s freedom of association claim.   
From the premise that it “makes little sense to treat CLS’s speech and 
association claims as discrete,” Ginsburg concluded that the Court’s 
“limited-public-forum precedents supply the appropriate framework for 
assessing both CLS’s speech and association rights.”251  The problem with 
this doctrinal move is two-fold.  First, it essentially elects rational basis 
scrutiny over strict scrutiny, and therefore all but preordains the 
outcome.252  Second, it casts aside the competing constitutional values 
underlying CLS’s freedom of association claim.253  
                                                                                                                          
248 Id. at 2978.  
249 Id. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
250 See, e.g., id. at 2976 (Hastings’ policy “encourages tolerance, cooperation, and learning among 
students” and “conveys the Law School’s decision ‘to decline to subsidize with public monies and 
benefits conduct of which the people of California disapprove.’”).  In addition to the doctrinal 
complications, Martinez involved a disputed factual question as to whether Hastings’ applied an all-
comers policy or a policy that prohibited certain kinds of discrimination, including discrimination 
based upon religion and sexual orientation.  The Court remanded on the question of whether Hastings 
selectively applied its all-comers policy.  Id. at 2995.  While this factual question might be important to 
a public forum analysis, it is less relevant to the freedom of association analysis that I believe the Court 
should have made.  The strength of CLS’s constitutional claim to exist as a group should not turn on 
whether the restriction against it is viewpoint neutral or selectively enforced against it.  
251 Id. 
252 See id. (“[T]he same considerations that have led us to apply a less restrictive level of scrutiny 
to speech in limited public forums as compared to other environments apply with equal force to 
expressive association occurring in limited public forums.”); id. (“[T]he strict scrutiny we have applied 
in some settings to laws that burden expressive association would, in practical effect, invalidate a 
defining characteristic of limited public forums—the State may ‘reserv[e] [them] for certain groups’”).  
After deciding to pursue a public forum analysis, the viewpoint neutrality of Hastings’ all-comers 
policy was self-evident to the majority.  See id. at 2993 (“It is, after all, hard to imagine a more 
viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all student groups to accept all comers.”); id. (“An all-
comers condition on access to RSO status, in short, is textbook viewpoint neutral.”).  Accordingly, the 
majority “consider[ed] whether Hastings’ policy is reasonable taking into account the RSO forum’s 
function and ‘all the surrounding circumstances,’” id. at 2988, and concluded that “the several 
justifications Hastings asserts in support of its all-comers requirement are surely reasonable in light of 
the RSO forum’s purposes.”  Id. at 2991.    
253 For example, Ginsburg cites an important article by Eugene Volokh.  Id. at 2985–86 (citing 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1919, 1940 (2006)).  Among other things, Volokh’s article considers a conflict very similar to the one 
at issue in Martinez: whether a public university can apply anti-discrimination rules to the Christian 
Legal Society.  Id. at 1935.  Ginsburg highlights Volokh’s observation that a school may limit official 
recognition to groups comprised only of students, even though this infringes upon the associational 
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CLS’s associational claim highlights the underlying conflict of values 
in this case: the clash between group autonomy and equality, the same 
tension at issue in Runyon and Roberts.  Taking this values clash seriously 
means refusing to make an artificial distinction between expression and 
conduct and recognizing that, in some cases, they are one and the same.  
Contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s insistence that “CLS’s conduct—not its 
Christian perspective—is, from Hastings’ vantage point, what stands 
between the group and RSO [registered student organization] status,”254 
CLS’s “conduct” is inseparable from its message. 
Ginsburg’s opinion misses this connection.  Quoting from CLS’s brief, 
she writes that “expressive association in this case is ‘the functional 
equivalent of speech itself’”255 to set up the idea that expressive association 
is entitled to no more constitutional protection than speech.  But CLS had 
asserted: 
[W]here one of the central purposes of a noncommercial 
expressive association is the communication of a moral 
teaching, its choice of who will formulate and articulate that 
message is treated as the functional equivalent of speech 
itself.256  
CLS wasn’t arguing that association is nothing more than speech but 
that association is itself a form of expression—who it selects as its 
members and leaders communicates a message.  CLS underscored this 
point elsewhere in its brief, arguing that “[b]ecause a group’s leaders 
define and shape the group’s message, the right to select leaders is an 
essential element of its right to speak.”257  Ginsburg interpreted this 
assertion to mean that “CLS suggests that its expressive-association claim 
plays a part auxiliary to speech’s starring role.” 258  That interpretation may 
be consistent with the Roberts understanding of expressive association, but 
as I have argued throughout this Article, it misses the more fundamental 
connection between a group’s message and its composition.   
Ginsburg distinguished the Court’s associational cases like Dale and 
Roberts because those cases “involved regulations that compelled a group 
                                                                                                                          
freedoms of those who wish to form a group with non-students.  Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.  The 
point is a nice one, but the non-student constraint could also be construed as a jurisdictional limit linked 
far more closely (and less ideologically) to the nature of the public forum than an all-comers policy.  
More importantly, Volokh spends considerable time accounting for the values introduced by the right 
of association.  Volokh, supra, at 1935.  The majority subsumes this dimension into its speech analysis 
and avoids the harder questions. 
254 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994. 
255 Id. at 2984–85 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 35). 
256 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 35. 
257 Id. at 18. 
258 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985 (citing Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 18). 
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to include unwanted members, with no choice to opt out.”259  But this is 
really a matter of perspective.  Sometimes a group must choose between 
receiving benefits and adhering to its policies at the cost of those 
benefits.260  But withholding some benefits—like access to meeting space 
or email lists or the opportunity to be part of a public forum—can be akin 
to stamping out a group’s existence.  After Martinez, the Hastings-
Christian-Group-that-Accepts-All-Comers can exist, and the Christian-
Legal-Society-for-Hastings-Law-Students-that-Can-Sometimes-Meet-on-
Campus-as-a-Matter-of-University-Discretion-If-Space-Is-Available-but-
Can’t-Recruit-Members-at-the-Student-Activities-Fair can exist.  But the 
Hastings Christian Legal Society—whose views and purposes are in no 
way sanctioned by and can be explicitly disavowed by Hastings—
cannot.261 
VII.  REMEMBERING THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY  
On the same day that the Court issued its Martinez opinion, it released 
its decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago.262  Justice Alito’s opinion in 
the latter case observed: 
In [United States v. Cruikshank], the Court held that the 
general “right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful 
purposes,” which is protected by the First Amendment, 
applied only against the Federal Government and not against 
the states.  Nonetheless, over 60 years later the Court held 
that the right of peaceful assembly was a “fundamental 
righ[t] . . . safeguarded by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”263 
It was only the sixth time in the last twenty years that the Court had 
even mentioned the right of assembly.264  But this passing nod to a long-
                                                                                                                          
259 Id. at 2986. 
260 Ginsburg cites Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1984), and Bob Jones Univ. 
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602–04 (1983). 
261 “Official recognition” is a term of art that doesn’t entail any endorsement of private groups by 
the state actor.  Hastings made clear that it “neither sponsor[]s nor endorse[s]” the views of registered 
student organizations and insisted that the groups inform third parties that they were not sponsored by 
the law school.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 4. 
262 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
263 Id. at 3031 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551–52 
(1876) and De Jonge v. Orgeon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937)). 
264 Other than McDonald, a majority opinion of the Supreme Court has mentioned the right of 
assembly five times in the last twenty years.  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 
2730 (2010) (“Our decisions scrutinizing penalties on simple association or assembly are therefore 
inapposite.”); District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790 (2008) (describing “right of the 
people” clause in relation to assembly); id. at 2797 (intimating that assembly and petition are two 
separate rights); Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 164 
(2002) (quoting discussion of free assembly in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539–40 (1945)); 
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forgotten right gestured toward the constitutional framework that should 
have decided Martinez and should have protected the Christian Legal 
Society.   
From the House debates over the Bill of Rights that appealed to 
William Penn’s defense of assembly to the rallying cries of the 
Democratic-Republican Societies, from the early suffragist and abolitionist 
movements of the antebellum era to the labor and civil rights movements 
of the Progressive Era, and from the political rhetoric of Abraham Lincoln 
to the political rhetoric of Martin Luther King, Jr., the right of assembly 
has emphasized the importance of shielding dissident groups from a state-
enforced majoritarianism throughout our nation’s history.265  As C. Edwin 
Baker has argued, “the function of constitutional rights, and more 
specifically the role of the right of assembly, is to protect self-expressive, 
nonviolent, noncoercive conduct from majority norms or political 
balancing and even to permit people to be offensive, annoying, or 
challenging to dominant norms.”266  This role of assembly and its appeal to 
groups of different ideologies “makes it a better ‘fit’ than the right of 
association within our nation’s legal and political heritage.”267  Indeed, 
principles of constitutional interpretation suggest that the First 
Amendment’s right of assembly, not the late-arriving and judicially-
constructed right of association, holds a central place in our constitutional 
tradition.268   
The importance of assembly is strikingly evident in Justice Brandeis’s 
famous opinion in Whitney v. California.269  The now discredited majority 
opinion expressed particular concern that Anita Whitney had undertaken 
her actions in concert with others, which “involve[d] even greater threat to 
the public peace and security than the isolated utterances and acts of 
                                                                                                                          
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n.1 (1995) (“The right of free speech, the right 
to teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights.” (citation omitted)); United States 
v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 476 (1995) (“‘Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify 
suppression of free speech and assembly.’” (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376, 
(1927))).  The last time the Court applied the constitutional right of assembly appears to have been in 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 88 (1982)—twenty-eight years ago.  
265 See generally Inazu, Forgotten Freedom, supra note 15 (chronicling the role of assembly in 
these historical events and movements).  
266 C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 134 (1989).  
267 Inazu, Forgotten Freedom, supra note 15, at 568.  By “fit,” I refer to the ways in which 
assembly falls plausibly within our tradition of American constitutionalism.  The notion of fit is 
intimated in different ways by both Ronald Dworkin and Alasdair MacIntyre.  See generally RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL 
THEORY (3d ed. 2007). 
268 Philip Bobbitt has suggested that we engage in six modalities of constitutional argument: 
textual, structural, prudential, historical, doctrinal, and ethical).  PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION xi, 7–8 (1982). 
269 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring).  The decision was formally overruled in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).  
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individuals.”270 
Rejecting this rationale, Brandeis penned some of the most well-
known words in American jurisprudence:  
Those who won our independence . . . believed that 
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are 
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion 
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily 
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious 
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert 
people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this 
should be a fundamental principle of the American 
government.271 
The freedoms of “speech and assembly” lie at the heart of Brandeis’s 
argument—the phrase appears eleven times in his brief concurrence.  The 
Court had linked these two freedoms only once before; after Whitney, the 
nexus occurs in over one hundred of its opinions.272  Brandeis’s entwining 
of speech and assembly establishes two important connections.  First, it 
recognizes that a group’s expression includes not only the spoken words of 
those assembled but also the expressive message inherent in the group’s 
existence.  Second, it emphasizes that the rights of speech and assembly 
extend across time, preceding the actual moment of expression or 
gathering.273  Just as freedom of speech guards against restrictions imposed 
prior to an act of speaking, assembly guards against restrictions imposed 
prior to an act of assembling—it protects a group’s autonomy, 
composition, and existence.274 
                                                                                                                          
270 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372. 
271 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  Judges and scholars have written volumes about these 
words and those that followed, but almost all of them focus on speech alone rather than speech and 
assembly.  Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in the landmark case New York Times v. Sullivan, 
deemed Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence the “classic formulation” of the fundamental principle 
underlying free speech.  376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Robert Cover, The Left, the Right, and the 
First Amendment: 1918–1928, 40 MD. L. REV. 371 (1981) (describing the “classic statement of free 
speech”); cf.  H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN 
HISTORY AND POLITICS 194 (2002). 
272 The only mention of “speech and assembly” prior to Whitney came in New York ex rel Doyle v. 
Atwell.  261 U.S. 590, 591 (1923) (noting that petitioners alleged a deprivation of the “rights of 
freedom of speech and assembly”). 
273 See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720–25 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); 
Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. New York, 360 U.S. 684, 697–98 (1959) (Douglas J., dissenting) (“I 
can find in the First Amendment no room for any censor whether he is scanning an editorial, reading a 
news broadcast, editing a novel or a play, or previewing a movie.”); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 
U.S. 395, 423 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“There is no free speech in the sense of the Constitution 
when permission must be obtained from an official before a speech can be made.  That is a previous 
restraint condemned by history and at war with the First Amendment.”). 
274 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (noting that Douds 
referred to “the varied forms of governmental action which might interfere with freedom of assembly” 
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As M. Glenn Abernathy argued in his seminal work, The Right of 
Assembly and Association, assembly “need not be artificially narrowed to 
encompass only the physical assemblage in a park or meeting hall” but 
“can justifiably be extended to include as well those persons who are 
joined together through organizational affiliation.”275  Abernathy also 
noted that assembly avoids the artificial line-drawing inherent in the right 
of association.  Writing in 1961, he observed that the Court’s initial 
recognition of a constitutional right of association three years earlier had 
inserted an instrumental gloss on group autonomy: 
It must be noted that [NAACP v. Alabama] does not 
clearly extend the First Amendment protection to all lawful 
affiliations or organizations.  What Justice Harlan discusses 
is the association “for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.”  
Clearly a vast number of existing associations would fall 
within this description, but it is questionable whether the 
characterization would fit the purely social club, the garden 
club, or perhaps even some kinds of trade or professional 
unions.276  
As Abernathy noted, this message-based analysis—explicitly 
recognized twenty-six years later in Roberts’s category of expressive 
association—is absent in the right of assembly:  “No such distinction has 
been drawn in the cases squarely involving freedom of assembly questions.  
The latter cases emphasize that the right extends to any lawful assembly, 
without a specific requirement that there be an intention to advance beliefs 
and ideas.”277 
The right of assembly may thus provide a less arbitrary and more 
persuasive framework for protecting dissenting practices than the right of 
                                                                                                                          
and concluding that “[c]ompelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in advocacy of 
particular beliefs is of the same order”); Am. Commc’ns Ass’n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) 
(“[T]he fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech or assembly does not 
determine the free speech question.  Under some circumstances, indirect ‘discouragements’ 
undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as 
imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2010).  The principle that assembly encompasses membership is also evident in the now 
discredited logic underlying a number of the communist cases decided prior to the Court’s recognition 
of the right of association.  See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Clark, 177 F.2d 79, 84 (D.C. 
Cir. 1949) (“[N]othing in the Hatch Act or the loyalty program deprives the Committee or its members 
of any property rights.  Freedom of speech and assembly is denied no one.  Freedom of thought and 
belief is not impaired.  Anyone is free to join the Committee and give it his support and 
encouragement.  Everyone has a constitutional right to do these things, but no one has a constitutional 
right to be a government employee.”); cf. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1950) 
(Edgerton, J., dissenting) (“[G]uilt by association . . . denies both the freedom of assembly guaranteed 
by the First Amendment and the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth.”). 
275 M. GLENN ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 173 (2d ed. rev. 1961). 
276 Id. at 236–37 (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. 449). 
277 Id. at 237. 
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expressive association.  Its approach is captured in Justice Rutledge’s 
opinion in one of the most important cases on the right of assembly, 
Thomas v. Collins.278  Rutledge argued that, because of the “preferred place 
given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms 
secured by the First Amendment,” only “the gravest abuses, endangering 
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.”279  He 
explained: 
Where the line shall be placed in a particular application 
rests, not on such generalities, but on the concrete clash of 
particular interests and the community’s relative evaluation 
[of] both of them and of how the one will be affected by the 
specific restriction, the other by its absence.  That judgment 
in the first instance is for the legislative body.  But in our 
system where the line can constitutionally be placed presents 
a question this Court cannot escape answering independently, 
whatever the legislative judgment, in the light of our 
constitutional tradition.  And the answer, under that tradition, 
can be affirmative, to support an intrusion upon this domain, 
only if grave and impending public danger requires this.280 
Justice Rutledge’s opinion also noted that the right of assembly 
guarded “not solely religious or political” causes but also “secular causes,” 
great and small.281  As Aviam Soifer has suggested, Rutledge’s “dynamic, 
relational language” emphasized that the right of assembly was “broad 
enough to include private as well as public gatherings, economic as well as 
political subjects, and passionate opinions as well as factual statements.”282 
Soifer, Rutledge, Abernathy, and Brandeis gesture toward an important 
insight about group autonomy.  Its primary value is not intimacy or 
expressivism—we have other rights, such as privacy and speech, that are 
better suited toward those ends.  Rather, its primary value is that it permits 
dissent to manifest through groups.  Justice Brennan glimpsed this value in 
Roberts when he noted that “collective effort on behalf of shared goals” is 
“especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in 
                                                                                                                          
278 323 U.S. 516 (1945).  
279 Id. at 530. 
280 Id. at 531–32 (internal citation omitted).   
281 Id. at 531.  The “preferred place” language originated in Justice Douglas’s opinion for the 
Court in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943), in which Douglas wrote: “Freedom of 
press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.” 
282 SOIFER, supra note 24, at 77–78; see also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937) (“The 
power of a state to abridge freedom of speech and of assembly is the exception rather than the  
rule . . . .”); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (“[T]he right [of assembly] . . . cannot be 
denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all 
civil and political institutions . . . .”); id. (“The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of 
free speech and free press and is equally fundamental . . . .”). 
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shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority.”283  This 
value of dissent entails risk because it strengthens a genuine pluralism 
against majoritarian demands for consensus.284  It resists what Nancy 
Rosenblum has called the liberal state’s “logic of congruence,” which 
requires “that the internal life and organization of associations mirror 
liberal democratic principles and practices.”285 
Dissenting practices often embody meaning different than that ascribed 
to them by outside observers, and “[m]any group expressions are only 
made intelligible by the practices that give them meaning.”286  Because 
“[c]hallenges to existing values and decisions to embody and express 
dissident values are precisely the choices and activities that cannot be 
properly evaluated by summations of existing preferences,” the right of 
assembly protects “activities that are unreasonable from the perspective of 
the existing order.”287  And a group need not lack privilege or status in 
                                                                                                                          
283 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 
U.S. 640, 647–48 (2000) (finding that freedom of association is “crucial in preventing the majority 
from imposing its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas” (footnote 
omitted)).  
284 The importance of dissent was downplayed by the “liberal consensus” that formed the 
background to the initial recognition of the constitutional right of association in the middle of the 
twentieth century.  Inazu, Strange Origins, supra note 16, at 541–42, 558 & n.558 (describing the 
prominence of mid-twentieth century liberalism that accompanied the Court’s initial framing of the 
constitutional right of association).  In particular, pluralists like David Truman and Robert Dahl failed 
to recognize that “the capacity for groups to maintain autonomous practices, detached from and even 
antithetical to the will of the majority, was in some ways a destabilizing freedom. . . .  [G]roup 
autonomy poses risk rather than stability for the democratic experiment.”  Id. at 542–45, 555–57.  For 
the contrast between the competing narratives of dissent and the pluralist consensus, see Sheldon S. 
Wolin, Democracy, Difference, and Re-Cognition, 21 POL. THEORY 464, 464 (1993), observing:  
From Roger Williams’s Bloody Tenent (1644) to John Calhoun’s Disquisition, 
Margaret Fuller’s Woman in the Nineteenth Century, Booker Washington’s Up from 
Slavery, and the Autobiography of Malcolm X, discursive representations of 
difference have appeared but until recently have had little effect on the main 
conceptual vocabulary or thematic structure of the theoretical literature of American 
politics.  Instead, from Madison’s Tenth Federalist to the writings of Mary Follett, 
Charles Beard, Arthur Bentley, David Truman, and Robert Dahl, those modes of 
difference mostly disappeared or were reduced to the status of interests.  The result: 
on one side, themes of separation, dismemberment, disunion, exploitation, 
exclusion, and revenge and, on the other, themes extolling American pluralism as 
the distinctive American political achievement and the main reason for the unrivaled 
stability of American society and its political system.   
To Wolin’s second list, we can add John Rawls, who became for Wolin the paradigmatic thinker of 
liberalism’s suppression of difference.  See SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY 
AND INNOVATION IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 549 (2004) (noting that the “repressive elements 
in Rawls’s liberalism . . . reflect an aversion to social conflict that is in keeping with his elevation of 
stability, cooperation, and unity as the fundamental values”). 
285 ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS, supra note 5, at 36; see also WILLIAM A. GALSTON, 
LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 3 (2002) (“Liberalism requires a robust though rebuttable presumption in favor of 
individuals and groups leading their lives as they see fit, within a broad range of legitimate variation, in 
accordance with their own understanding of what gives life meaning and value.”). 
286 Inazu, Forgotten Freedom, supra note 15, at 567.  See generally MACINTYRE, supra note 267. 
287 BAKER, supra note 266, at 134.  
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society to assume an “unreasonable” or dissenting posture—dissent is 
defined by a group’s refusal to ascribe to state-enforced majoritarian norms 
in the particular setting in which it finds itself.288  Successful businessmen, 
non-practicing Jewish male college students, and Christian law students all 
play a part in “political and cultural diversity.”289  When the state seeks to 
inhibit or destroy their way of life, the groups that they inhabit become 
forms of “dissident expression.”290  We tolerate these forms of expression 
not because we endorse them or seek to emulate them, but because we 
recognize the state’s tendencies to dominate and control through the 
interpretations and meanings it assigns to a group’s activities.   
Facilitating a space for meaningful dissent against suppression by 
majoritarian norms is also a fundamentally democratic goal.  It protects not 
only Christian groups that oppose homosexual conduct but also gay groups 
that embrace and embody it.291  As Stephen Carter has argued, 
“[d]emocracy needs diversity because democracy advances through 
dissent, difference, and dialogue.  The idea that the state should . . . create 
a set of meanings, [and] try to alter the structure of institutions that do not 
match it, is ultimately destructive of democracy because it destroys the 
differences that create the dialectic.”292 Beginning from a very different 
perspective, William Eskridge arrives at a similar conclusion: “The state 
must allow individual nomic communities to flourish or wither as they 
may, and the state cannot as a normal matter become the means for the 
                                                                                                                          
288 Cf. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 196 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he status quo of 
the college or university is the governing body (trustees or overseers), administrative officers, who 
include caretakers, and the police, and the faculty.” (emphasis added)). 
289 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).  
290 Id. 
291 See, e.g., Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 2, at 9 (“The genius of the First 
Amendment is that it knows no bias.  Protections for one minority voice extend to all.”).  One 
proponent of gay rights has critiqued the “overly formal, inconsequential, empty version of equality” 
that underlies the application of anti-discrimination law to the Christian Legal Society.  See Joan W. 
Howarth, Religious Exercise, Expression, and Association in Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 889, 897 
(2009). 
292 Stephen L. Carter, Liberal Hegemony and Religious Resistance: An Essay on Legal Theory, in 
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 25, 33 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001).  The 
importance of protecting difference and dissent is particularly relevant to the “counter-assimilationist” 
ideal of religious freedom that allows people “of different religious faiths to maintain their differences 
in the face of powerful pressures to conform.”  Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and 
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1139 (1990).  In the context of religious freedom, and in 
contrast to his relatively unsympathetic treatment of the Jaycees throughout his Roberts opinion, Justice 
Brennan adopted a more communitarian approach.  See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from 
participation in a larger religious community.  Such a community represents an ongoing tradition of 
shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals.”); Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 524 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A critical function of the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment is to protect the rights of members of minority religions against [the] 
quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as 
unimportant, because unfamiliar.”). 
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triumph of one community over all others.”293 
The call for greater group autonomy through the right of assembly is 
not without limiting principles.  The text of the First Amendment offers 
one: assemblies must be peaceable.294  Our constitutional, social, and 
economic history suggests another: anti-discrimination norms should 
typically prevail when applied to commercial entities.295  Other questions 
are more difficult to answer.  I take up some of them in my forthcoming 
book, Liberty’s Refuge.296  Among the most difficult is whether the right of 
assembly tolerates racial discrimination by peaceable, noncommercial 
groups.  Our constitutional history supports a plausible argument that “race 
is just different,” that the state’s interest in eliminating racial 
discrimination justifies a nearly total ban on racially segregated private 
groups.297  As Justice Stewart states in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: 
Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment 
rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents 
of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination 
into effective legislation. . . . [W]hen racial discrimination 
herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy 
property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of 
slavery.298 
For these reasons, we might plausibly treat race differently when 
considering the boundaries of group autonomy.  I would be quick to do so 
as a matter of personal preference—I can think of no racially 
discriminatory group to which I attach personal value or worth.  But 
treating race differently in all dimensions of the private sphere ultimately 
                                                                                                                          
293 William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and 
Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2415 (1997).  
294 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble . . . .”).   
295 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 2 (“All noncommercial expressive associations, 
regardless of their beliefs, have a constitutionally protected right to control the content of their speech 
by excluding those who do not share their essential purposes and beliefs from voting and leadership 
roles.” (emphasis added)).  Justice O’Connor proposed a similar line.  See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635–36 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  As I suggested earlier in this Article, O’Connor’s requirement that an 
association be “predominantly engaged” in expressive activity introduces considerable difficulty to her 
conceptual categories, and her conclusion that the Jaycees itself was a commercial association is 
problematic.  Id. at 635–37.  For a clearer example of a commercial association, see City of Dallas v. 
Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24–25 (1989), in which the Supreme Court denied the freedom of association 
claim of the owner of a skating rink who challenged a Dallas ordinance restricting admission to “dance 
halls” to people between the ages of fourteen and eighteen.  As the Court noted, “[t]he hundreds of 
teenagers who congregate each night at this particular dance hall are not members of any organized 
association; they are patrons of the same business establishment.”  Id. at 24.   
296 See JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF 
ASSEMBLY (forthcoming 2011, Yale University Press).  
297 Even here, however, very few people make categorical arguments—the Ku Klux Klan, for 
example, is still permitted to tout its racist message. 
298 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).    
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undercuts a vision of assembly that protects pluralism and dissent against 
state-enforced orthodoxy.  We cannot move from the premise that genuine 
pluralism matters to an effort to rid ourselves of the groups that we don’t 
like.299   
On the other hand, the right of assembly will not always trump 
competing interests.  Courts will have to draw lines and balance interests, 
just as they do with the freedom of speech.  In my view, the protections for 
assembly ought to be constrained when a private group wields so much 
power in a given situation—as private groups did in the American South 
from the decades following the Civil War to the end of the Civil Rights 
Era—that it prevents other groups from meaningfully pursuing their own 
visions of pluralism and dissent.300  Seen in this light, assembly is a self-
limiting right.301  But as long as private groups do not tip the balance of 
power in this way, we should tolerate even those groups that offend our 
sensibilities.  
Line drawing questions like the permissibility of race-based 
discrimination are immensely important.  But these difficult questions 
should not prevent us from beginning to address the inadequacies of 
                                                                                                                          
299 The question of racial discrimination, and specifically discrimination by whites against African 
Americans, is one of the most difficult issues confronting any argument for greater group autonomy.  
My argument would permit some racially discriminatory groups.  It is an argument rooted in social 
change and hope in social change—that we are a different society today than we were in 1960 and that 
we will continue to hold the ground that has been won.  I do not mean to suggest that we have solved 
the problem of race.  I do argue that in this, as in many other areas of the law, we recognize that the 
structural politics today are different.  See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. 
Ct. 2504, 2516 (2009) (“More than 40 years ago, this Court concluded that ‘exceptional conditions’ 
prevailing in certain parts of the country justified extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our 
federal system.  In part due to the success of that legislation, we are now a very different Nation. 
Whether conditions continue to justify such legislation is a difficult constitutional question we do not 
answer today.” (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966))); Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no 
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491–92 
(1992) (“[W]ith the passage of time, the degree to which racial imbalances continue to represent 
vestiges of a constitutional violation may diminish . . .”); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 
267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“In the absence of particularized findings, a court could uphold 
remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future”); 
Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., Va., 391 U.S. 430, 435–38 (1968) (holding that a school 
district may be declared unitary and lacking racial discrimination based on satisfactory performance in 
five areas of a school district’s operations).  
300 My proposal for assembly differs in this respect from what Andrew Koppelman and Tobias 
Wolff have called the “neolibertarian[]” position, which they attribute to an eclectic group of scholars 
that includes David Bernstein, Dale Carpenter, Richard Epstein, Michael McConnell, John McGinnis, 
Michael Paulsen, Nancy Rosenblum, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin.  KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 
6, at xii (quotation marks omitted).    
301 A similar rationale underlies the free exercise of religion.  A religious group that used its 
freedom to establish a theocracy would undermine the principles of the free exercise of religion.  The 
relationship between the right of assembly and the religion clauses of the First Amendment is a yet 
unexplored dimension of constitutional law that might shed some light on the troubled jurisprudence 
surrounding “church-state” issues.  
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current doctrine.  This Article has suggested that the current balance—or 
lack of balance—is deeply problematic.  Our world is one in which courts 
have decided that fraternities cannot exclude women and Christian student 
groups cannot exclude those who do not share their religious convictions.  
The relevant question today is not whether a constitutional vision that 
offers strong protections for pluralism and dissent will be realized (as if 
this area of the law could ever reach finality), but whether we ought to 
move in that direction. 
Some people will be unpersuaded by any constitutional vision that 
gives greater protections to dissenting groups, particularly one that limits 
the reach of anti-discrimination laws.  They will push instead for greater 
congruence and less difference.  That is the logic underlying the Court’s 
decision in Martinez.  It surfaces in Justice Kennedy’s belief that a state-
run public school “quite properly may conclude that allowing an oath or 
belief-affirming requirement, or an outside conduct requirement, could be 
divisive for student relations.”302  It is the fundamental tenet of the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Truth v. Kent that equates a Christian club’s desire to 
limit its members to Christians to invidious discrimination.303 
Those who endorse decisions like Martinez and Kent and reject a 
constitutional vision that challenges the current approach to protecting 
group autonomy need to provide a better justification for the categories of 
intimate and expressive association.  They should articulate a convincing 
constitutional doctrine and ethos that legitimates the jurispathic silencing 
of “those who would make a nomos other than that of the state.”304  What 
Thomas Emerson observed almost fifty years ago remains true today: 
“[T]he constitutional source of ‘the right of association,’ the principles 
which underlie it, the extent of its reach, and the standards by which it is to 
be applied have never been clearly set forth.”305  The protections for group 
autonomy deserve greater respect—and a more coherent jurisprudential 
approach—than we have given them thus far.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has called attention to flaws in the Supreme Court’s 
categories of intimate and expressive association.  It is unlikely that these 
categories reflect “well-settled” doctrine.306  But even if they do, 
sometimes well-settled doctrine is wrong.  The very real constitutional 
issues unfolding before us should not be answered by rote invocations of 
                                                                                                                          
302 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2998 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
303 Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 644–45 (9th Cir. 2008).  
304 Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983). 
305 Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 2 
(1964). 
306 KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 6, at xi. 
 2010]             UNSETTLING “WELL-SETTLED” LAW OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION             207 
these ill-formed categories.   
The alternative constitutional vision of assembly is not without risk.  It 
reintroduces a weighing of constitutional values that some would prefer 
remain suppressed.  It strengthens protections for groups that you and I do 
not like.  But it also strengthens protections for groups that we care about, 
against a state-enforced majoritarianism whose threat we might not 
recognize.  As Justice Black once wrote: “I do not believe that it can be too 
often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly 
guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate 
or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.”307 
                                                                                                                          
307 Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, 
J., dissenting).  
